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Exhaustion Cannot Stifle Innovation:
A Limitation on the “First Sale” Doctrine
Joseph L. Roth*
The Constitution encourages innovation. The Intellectual Property
Clause empowers Congress to promote science by granting exclusive rights to
patent owners. Everyone benefits, at least in theory, from such an
arrangement. The public benefits because inventors have an incentive to
create new technologies that the public then acquires once the patent term
expires. Inventors benefit during the patent term by excluding the public
from (or more likely, selling and leasing the rights to) their inventions. Early
on, however, the Supreme Court set an important limitation on the right to
exclude. The Court recognized that purchasers have a property interest in
the articles they purchase, even if patented. The Court determined that this
property interest divests the patent owner’s interest in those articles. This
limitation—known as the “first sale” doctrine—strives to strike a balance
between the rights of patent and personal property owners. Essentially,
purchasers obtain full rights to their purchased articles while the patent
owner retains control over unsold articles. But patent owners have long
attempted to circumvent the first-sale doctrine. One technique involves selling
patented articles with express “use restrictions” that purport to limit the
ways that a purchaser may legally use the article. Scholars have debated
whether use restrictions are enforceable. Most believe that the Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence prohibits such restrictions. Others—including the
Federal Circuit—have held such restrictions to be permissible. This Note
explains that the question is not so black and white. Rather, courts must
look ad hoc at the purpose behind the restriction. If the restriction simply
helps the patent owner to compete in the market, then the restriction is
unenforceable. But if the restriction is intertwined with the invention—in
other words, if the nature of the invention warrants the restriction—then the
restriction is enforceable. Otherwise, the patent owner would not have the

* J.D., University of California, Irvine School of Law. Many thanks to Professor Dan Burk for his
invaluable support throughout the drafting of this Note. Further thanks to Professors Shauhin Talesh,
Ezra Ross, and Christopher Leslie for their constant mentorship throughout my law school career.
Finally, I reserve the greatest thanks for my wife, Katherine, whose unyielding support allowed me to
reach this milestone and many others.
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incentive to create the invention in the first place. The “first sale” doctrine
cannot stifle innovation.
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INTRODUCTION
Imagine that a patent owner, Amy, has a patent on a novel type of bicycle.
Amy makes and sells such bicycles to customers for $300 each. But because each
bicycle lasts many years, Amy has struggled to maintain a steady customer flow. To
increase business, Amy decides to only sell bicycles to customers who agree to
dispose of the bicycle after one year. Customers now must buy a new bicycle each
year. As an incentive, Amy drops the sale price to $200.
In this case, Amy has attempted to place a “use restriction”—i.e., an
enforceable condition1—on the bicycle. In theory, Amy would be happy to raise the
price and eliminate the restriction. She knows that customers would prefer to
purchase bicycles without restrictions, and if she had enough customers, she would
not need the restriction. But she simply does not have enough customers. In other
words, the market controls whether the restriction exists.
Now instead, consider Thomas, the owner of a patent on 3-D glasses. Thomas
plans to sell the 3-D glasses to movie theaters. But, during the testing phase, some
moviegoers develop vicious eye infections. Thomas determines the 3-D glasses—
which become contaminated after an initial use—are causing these infections. He
decides to sell the glasses only to theaters that agree to dispose of the glasses after
a single use.2
Like Amy, Thomas has also placed a use restriction on the patented article.
However, unlike Amy’s bicycle sales, the nature of the 3-D glasses—rather than the
market—controls.3 Thomas’ restriction protects the public health. Unlike Amy,

1. See Thomas Arno, Comment, Use Restrictions and the Retention of Property Interests in Chattels
Through Intellectual Property Rights, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 279, 282 (1994) (“The term ‘use restriction’
refers to an enforceable obligation on the part of an owner of an item to use it in a particular way.”).
Although a use restriction may be placed in a contract, see Vincent Chiappetta, Patent Exhaustion: What’s
It Good for?, 51 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1087, 1118 (2011), simply providing purchasers with notice is
sufficient, Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 26 (1912), overruled in part by Motion Picture Patents Co.
v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917). In most cases, the patent owner affixes a label—called
a “notice”—to the sold items, informing purchasers of the restriction. Arno, supra, at 283 n.21. Such
notice eliminates the possibility that innocent purchasers will be liable for patent infringement. See infra
notes 143-44 and accompanying text.
2. This example is based on Marks v. Polaroid Corp., 237 F.2d 428 (1st Cir. 1956). Polaroid owned
patents on a type of polarizer and sold 3-D glasses that practiced those patents. Id. at 429, 436. To
prevent eye infections, Polaroid prohibited reuse of the glasses. Id. The First Circuit held the District
Court did not abuse its discretion in enforcing the prohibition. Id. at 437. As discussed in Section
III.A.3.a, infra, this use restriction is enforceable.
3. Of course, in reality, the patent owner may have monetary incentives as well. The single-use
restriction on the 3-D glasses would allow the patent owner to sell more glasses. The mere potential for
market expansion, however, is not dispositive. The Supreme Court has made clear it will look to the
“substance and realities of the transaction” to determine whether a condition was intended to
“secur[e] . . . that exclusive right . . . which is granted through the patent law, or whether, under color
of such a purpose, it is . . . an effort to profitably extend the scope of its patent.” Straus v. Victor
Talking Mach. Co., 243 U.S. 490, 497–98 (1917). In Marks, the District Court noted the use restriction
“guaranteed an expansion of Polaroid’s business,” but found that Polaroid had properly raised
“countervailing public policy considerations.” Marks, 237 F.2d at 436–37.
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Thomas cannot justify removing the restriction simply by raising the purchase
price.4
Finally, consider a patent on genetically modified soybeans. Frank, the patent
owner, sells to farmers, who use the beans to grow herbicide-resistant crops. The
crops themselves yield more soybeans, but Frank prohibits farmers from planting
any second-generation beans. He contends that without the restriction, the patent
would become worthless after a single sale: no farmer would purchase soybeans if
she could just grow the beans instead.5
The market undoubtedly influences this use restriction6 (Frank wants
customers to continue to buy soybeans). But unlike Amy’s bicycle sales, here, a
single sale would destroy Frank’s ability to make any future sales. Farmers could just
grow the beans themselves. In other words, the nature of the invention—rather than
the market—justifies the restriction.
Overall, the market controls the restriction in the first example; the nature of
the invention controls in the latter examples. In each case, if a purchaser disregards
the use restriction, can the patent owner sue for patent infringement?7 As discussed
below, the first restriction is unenforceable, but the latter two should be enforced.
This answer turns on the scope of the patent “first sale” doctrine.8 Under the
doctrine, the first authorized sale of a patented article “exhausts”—or eliminates—
the patent owner’s right to control the use of that particular article.9 The patent
owner, through the first sale, has received her full “reward” as to that article, and
4. There are multiple reasons why a patent owner would care about the public health (aside
from basic morality). The owner needs to protect its brand name and also shield itself against potential
infringement suits. In Marks, Polaroid acknowledged that it feared liability. Id. at 436.
5. This example is taken from the facts of Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761 (2013).
6. In the actual Bowman case, the Court determined that petitioner Bowman had improperly
made, rather than used, the patented invention. Id. at 1766. The first-sale doctrine only enables a
purchaser to use or sell the purchased articles; the purchaser may not construct a new invention. Id.
The Court, by ruling that Bowman had not used the invention improperly, thus avoided the question of
whether the use restriction would have been enforceable. However, it would not be difficult to imagine
that, in the future, a similar set of facts will arise where the purchaser has used, rather than made, the
invention. In that scenario, the Court will be faced with the very question it managed to avoid in Bowman.
7. It appears possible that, regardless, the patent owner could always sue for breach of contract.
Quanta Comput., Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 637 n.7 (2008) (stating the Court “express[es]
no opinion on whether contract damages might be available” for use restriction violations). This
question is beyond the scope of this Note. It is clear, however, that a contract suit is generally not an
adequate substitute for a patent infringement suit. An infringement suit allows for treble damages and
attorney’s fees, and is more likely to warrant injunctive relief. Erin Julia Daida Austin, Note, Reconciling
the Patent Exhaustion and Conditional Sale Doctrines in Light of Quanta Computer v. LG Electronics, 30
CARDOZO L. REV. 2947, 2950–51 (2009). Further, a breach of contract suit requires privity of contract,
and is subject to heightened antitrust scrutiny. Id. at 2949, 2951.
8. The “first sale” doctrine is also called the “exhaustion” doctrine. Static Control Components,
Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 2d 575, 578 (E.D. Ky. 2009). Scholars have noted, however,
that the term “exhaustion” is technically incorrect, as it implies that the patent right is used up, while in
reality, the patent owner only loses the ability to control the specific articles sold. Chiappetta, supra note
1, at 1087 n.2. I prefer to use the term “first sale,” although I occasionally use the term “exhaustion”
where more grammatically appropriate.
9. Quanta, 553 U.S. at 625.
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should not be allowed to “double dip” by receiving further post-sale
compensation.10
But may a patent owner sell the patented article with express use restrictions?
The Federal Circuit in Mallinckrodt v. Medipart found such restrictions enforceable.11
The court held that—because such restrictions are freely bargained for—the
restrictions are permissible so long as they appropriately represent the patent
owner’s reward.12 For example, Amy the bicycle owner could sell bicycles for $300,
but due to the restriction, had to drop the price to $200, presumably to prevent
consumers from buying restrictionless bicycles elsewhere. In such a case,
Mallinckrodt would say that Amy is not “double dipping,” but rather is simply
receiving a single, bargained-for reward. Under this “conditional sale” theory,13 the
restrictions in all three examples above are enforceable.
The Supreme Court may have felt differently. In Quanta Computer v. LG
Electronics,14 the Supreme Court threw doubt on the continued viability of
Mallinckrodt and has caused scholars15 and courts16 alike to hold that Quanta has
overruled Mallinckrodt implicitly.17 The Court stated broadly that an “initial
10. Eric J. Rogers, The Inexhaustible Right to Exclude Reproduction Doctrine, 14 COLUM. SCI. & TECH.
L. REV. 389, 443 (2013) (explaining that the first-sale doctrine serves to prevent “double-dipping”); see
also Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 453, 456 (1873).
11. Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 709 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
12. Id. at 704–05, 708 (stating that “private parties retain the freedom to contract concerning
conditions of sale,” so long as the conditions are “reasonably within the reward which the patentee . . .
is entitled to secure” (citation omitted)). Mallinckrodt interprets a restriction to be within the patent
owner’s reward so long as the “subject matter [is] within the scope of the patent claims.” Id. at 708. As
discussed in Section III.C, infra, it is this interpretation—rather than the overall holding—of Mallinckrodt
that is misguided.
13. Austin, supra note 7, at 2948. Some scholars refer to this theory as the “Mallinckrodt
doctrine.” Rogers, supra note 10, at 409.
14. Quanta, 553 U.S. 617.
15. E.g., Daryl Lim, Self-Replicating Technologies and the Challenge for the Patent and Antitrust Laws, 32
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 131, 200 (2013) (“The correct view seems to be that a post-sale condition
cannot continue to haunt subsequent purchases . . . .”); Alfred C. Server & William J. Casey, ContractBased Post-Sale Restrictions on Patented Products Following Quanta, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 561, 597 (2013) (“Based
on a review of . . . Quanta, we conclude[ ] that Mallinckrodt has been overruled.”).
16. E.g., Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Ink Techs. Printer Supplies, LLC, No. 1:10-CV-564, 2014 WL
1276133, at *6 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 27, 2014) (“Mallinckrodt was overruled by Quanta sub silentio.”), reh’g
granted Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Impression Prods., Inc., 785 F.3d 565 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Static Control
Components, Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 2d 575, 578 (E.D. Ky. 2009) (“After reviewing
Quanta, Mallinckrodt, and the parties’ arguments, this Court is persuaded that Quanta overruled
Mallinckrodt sub silentio.”).
17. The Quanta opinion made no mention of Mallinckrodt. See generally Quanta, 553 U.S. 617. This
silence makes it unclear just what the Justices thought about Mallinckrodt. Some scholars say it doesn’t
matter. They argue that Quanta is wholly irreconcilable with Mallinckrodt. See supra note 15. They also
note, correctly, that in a separate part of the opinion, Quanta implicitly overruled part of Bandag v. Al
Bolser’s Tire Stores, another Federal Circuit case. Harold C. Wegner, Post-Quanta, Post-Sale Patentee Controls,
7 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 682, 687 (2008). The argument is that, clearly, the Quanta Justices
were more than happy to quietly overrule cases that day. This Note contends, however, that the Court’s
silence evidenced its intention to leave part of Mallinckrodt untouched. See infra Section III.C.2. On April
14, 2015, the Federal Circuit announced it would go en banc to determine whether to overrule
Mallinckrodt in light of Quanta. Lexmark, 785 F.3d 565. As this Note goes to press, the en banc decision
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authorized sale of a patented item terminates all patent rights to that item”18 and
declined to enforce a freely bargained-for use restriction.19 The Quanta decision gave
support to the “single royalty” theory: the idea that the initial purchase price is the
entire reward.20 Under the single-royalty theory, all three restrictions above are
unenforceable.
But the single-royalty theory has problems. First, why didn’t Quanta expressly
overrule Mallinckrodt?21 In fact, as discussed below, the Supreme Court, throughout
much of its jurisprudence, appears to decide patent exhaustion cases narrowly on
the facts.22 Why does the Court not provide a bright-line rule, stating that patent
owners cannot use conditions to circumvent exhaustion?
Second, if the “single-royalty” theory were the bright-line rule, patent owners
could simply circumvent that rule. As discussed below, longstanding precedent
provides that a patent owner may license a patented article with restrictions.23 In other
words, if a licensee sells the article in violation of those restrictions, the patent owner
may sue the purchaser for patent infringement.24 The problem is that a patent owner
is still forthcoming. As this Note explains, Mallinckrodt’s reasoning conflicts with Supreme Court
jurisprudence stretching back to the early twentieth century. See infra Section III.C.1. Thus, if the
Supreme Court were considering the issue, most of Mallinckrodt should be overruled. However, the
Court’s opinion in Quanta, as explained below, is consistent with Mallinckrodt. See infra Section III.C.2.
Here, the issue before the Federal Circuit is whether it should overrule Mallinckrodt “in light of Quanta.”
Lexmark, 785 F.3d at 566. In other words, if the Federal Circuit is to overrule Mallinckrodt, then Quanta
should have added something to the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence that warrants that result. This is
something Quanta does not do. For this reason, the Federal Circuit should not overrule Mallinckrodt.
For this Note’s purposes, regardless of whether the Federal Circuit overrules Mallinckrodt, the Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence will remain the same—use restrictions are unenforceable unless necessary to
foster innovation. See infra Section III.
18. Quanta, 553 U.S. at 625.
19. Id. at 638; see also F. Scott Kieff, Quanta v. LG Electronics: Frustrating Patent Deals by Taking
Contracting Options off the Table?, 2007–08 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 315, 316 (2008) (“[Quanta involved] a
sophisticated seller and a sophisticated buyer, with subsequent downstream sales from the initial buyer
to additional sophisticated buyers (where all relevant parties well understood the express terms of the
relevant contract).”).
20. See Chiappetta, supra note 1, at 1123.
21. Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, The Federal Circuit’s Licensing Law Jurisprudence: Its Nature and
Influence, 84 WASH. L. REV. 199, 236 (2009) (“Notably, the Supreme Court did not overrule Mallinckrodt
even though it was strongly urged to do so by the U.S. Solicitor General and others.”). Professor
Gomulkiewicz finds that “[i]nstead, by [this] approach, the Quanta Computer decision quietly affirmed
Mallinckrodt and its progeny.” Id. at 237.
22. See, e.g., Chiappetta, supra note 1, at 1101, 1104 (explaining that the Court’s analysis has
frequently “go[ne] beyond that required if exhaustion prevented all patent enforcement of post-sale
restrictions”); Gomulkiewicz, supra note 21, at 237 (explaining that Quanta could be read as turning
narrowly on the facts).
23. See infra Section III.B. As explained below, this Note contends that the law regarding licensee
restrictions and purchaser restrictions are actually two sides of the same coin. See infra Section III.B.1.
The same rule applies to both: such restrictions are permissible only to the extent necessary to
encourage innovation. See infra Section III.B.1. Patent owners will not be able to circumvent the firstsale doctrine simply by using licensee restrictions.
24. Gen. Talking Pictures Corp. v. W. Elec. Co., 304 U.S. 175, 181, 183 (1938). As noted below,
the purchaser must have notice of the licensee’s restriction. Id. at 180–81; see also infra notes 143–44 and
accompanying text.
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seeking to restrict a purchaser could use a licensee as a “middleman.” For example,
say Amy the bicycle owner hires Bob the bicycle maker to make and sell Amy’s
bicycles. Amy tells Bob, “By the way, you don’t have the authority to sell bicycles
to people who want to use the bicycles for over a year.”25 Bob is a licensee;
therefore, under the bright-line rule, a purchaser who uses such a bicycle for over a
year would be a patent infringer.26 It seems unlikely that the Court would create a
rule that hinges on whether or not the transaction involves a licensee.
Third, and most importantly, what would happen if application of the singleroyalty theory would hinder innovation? The Constitution empowers Congress to
“promote the . . . useful Arts,”27 and the Court has made clear that the patent
owner’s “reward” is the sole means of promoting such innovation.28 What if a scenario
arises where the “reward” cannot be obtained through a single royalty? The Court
would then be at a quandary: How could the Court promote innovation but also
adhere to the single-royalty theory?29
This Note first argues that the single-royalty theory—and not the conditionalsale theory—controls most cases. A patent owner has control of the purchase price;
she should increase that price to a level adequate to receive her reward. She cannot
rely on use restrictions. If her invention is important, her reward will be great; if not,
her reward will be smaller. Under this analysis, the initial bicycle restriction discussed
above is unenforceable.
This Note contends, however, that if, due to the nature of the invention, the
patent owner cannot eliminate the need for the use restrictions through raising the
purchase price—then, and only then, does the conditional-sale theory apply. As the 3D glasses and soybean examples demonstrate, in some cases use restrictions may be
necessary to protect the public health or a patent’s vitality. These goals cannot be
met simply by increasing the purchase price. If such conditions were unenforceable,
then inventors would be unlikely to invest in their inventions, and innovation would
be stifled. The 3-D glasses and soybean restrictions, therefore, are enforceable.
25. This example in similar to the facts of Mitchell v. Hawley. Mitchell v. Hawley, 83 U.S. (16
Wall.) 544 (1872). In Mitchell, the patent owner prohibited his licensee from selling patented article for
use after a certain date. Id. at 545. The licensee sold an article in violation of the restriction, and the
Court found that the purchaser’s use after the applicable date constituted patent infringement. Id. at
546. Other commentators have also recognized a patent owner’s potential ability to circumvent the
first-sale doctrine in this manner. See Austin, supra note 7, at 2972–73.
26. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
27. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. I generally refer to this process of promoting the useful arts as
“fostering innovation.”
28. See United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 278 (1942).
29. To understand this dilemma, we must define the patent owner’s “reward.” Many patent
scholars agree that the reward is the minimum incentive required to promote innovation. See Harry First,
Controlling the Intellectual Property Grab: Protect Innovation, Not Innovators, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 365, 376 (2007).
The Court has said that the size of the incentive will depend on the importance of the invention. Motion
Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 513 (1917). This incentive, however, will
clearly vary depending on the specific facts at issue. The Court, therefore, must carefully review the
facts and must ensure that innovation is always fostered. For a more detailed discussion, see Section
III.A.1, infra.
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This contention justifies the Court’s hesitancy to establish a bright-line rule.
In fact, a bright-line rule would be contrary to the Court’s jurisprudence. The Court
has stated that with regard to first-sale cases, it will rule ad hoc—no further than it
must.30 The Court has also required that the patent owner receive “all the
consideration” for the article’s use,31 and has declared that the Patent Act must “be
fairly or even liberally construed.”32 Moreover, the Court has expressly stated: “The
test has been whether . . . it may fairly be said that the patentee has received his
reward for the use of the article”33—an ad hoc consideration.
This contention also explains why the Court treats restrictions on purchasers
and licensees differently. For purchasers, only rarely—as seen in the 3-D glasses and
soybean examples—is a use restriction necessary to secure an adequate reward. But
for licensees, for a variety of reasons, a broader range of restrictions is necessary.34
Nevertheless, a patent owner must still justify a restriction on a licensee; i.e., a court
will inquire as to whether the patent owner truly needs the restriction.35 In other
words, Amy the bicycle owner cannot restrict Bob the bicycle maker’s sales unless
she has a valid reason for doing so. She cannot use the licensee/purchaser
distinction to circumvent the first-sale doctrine.
Section I discusses the origins and purposes of the first-sale doctrine. Section
I also depicts the rise of, and the rationale behind, the conditional-sale theory in the
early twentieth century. Section II discusses the subsequent demise of the
conditional-sale theory and the rise of the single-royalty theory. This Section makes
clear that—even prior to Quanta—Mallinckrodt’s reasoning conflicted with Supreme
Court precedent. Section III demonstrates that the Court has not completely closed
the door on the conditional-sale theory. Rather, the patent owner must always
receive a reward necessary to foster innovation. Thus, if a patent owner
demonstrates that the initial purchase price cannot serve as an adequate reward,
then a court must uphold a necessary use restriction.

30. Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 453, 455 (1873) (stating the Court must “decide in each
case no more than what is directly in issue”); see also Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761, 1769
(2013) (“Our holding today is limited—addressing the situation before us . . . .”).
31. See, e.g., Adams, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) at 456 (emphasis added); General Talking Pictures Corp.
v. W. Elec. Co., 305 U.S. 175, 177 (1938) (“full consideration”).
32. Bauer & Cie v. O’Donnell, 229 U.S. 1, 10 (1913). Strict application of the royalty theory
would not be a liberal construction of the Patent Act. The ad hoc analysis proposed here ensures that
patent owners receive a full reward, but also stay within the limits intended by Congress.
33. Masonite, 316 U.S. at 278.
34. See infra Section III.B. This same logic also explains why the first-sale doctrine does not
permit a purchaser to “make” a new copy of a patented article. If a purchaser could make more copies
of the invention, then the patent owner would have great trouble excluding others from that invention.
Bowman, 133 S. Ct. at 1766. In other words, the patent owner would not have received an adequate
reward sufficient to foster innovation. See id. (“[T]he purpose of the patent law is fulfilled . . . when the
patentee has received his reward . . . .” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)).
35. See infra Section III.B.

Roth__production read v5 (clean) (Do Not Delete)

2015]

3/13/2016 7:17 PM

A LIMITATION ON THE “FIRST SALE” DOCTRINE
I.

1239

OVERVIEW OF THE FIRST-SALE DOCTRINE
A. Early Beginnings

The Patent Clause of the U.S. Constitution empowers Congress “[t]o promote
the . . . useful Arts,” by providing inventors with “the exclusive Right” to their
discoveries for a limited time period.36 In 1790, Congress passed the first patent
statute, which became one of the nation’s very first laws.37 Aside from some early
procedural changes, the basic structure of the American patent system has been
constant throughout history.38
From the very beginning, the right to exclude others39 has been a core feature
of patent law.40 This exclusive right encourages inventors to invest in the research
and development of their inventions.41 Presently, the statute empowers the patent
owner to prevent others from making, using, selling, offering to sell, or importing a
patented invention.42 The patent owner may sue infringers43 and may receive
damages or an injunction to remedy the infringing conduct.44
The “first sale” doctrine provides a complete defense to patent
infringement.45 Under the first-sale doctrine, the first authorized sale of a patented
article terminates the patent owner’s exclusive right to “use” or to “sell” the article
sold.46 As a result, the purchaser may use, sell, or dispose of the article as he pleases,
without fear of infringement.47 To this day, the doctrine is entirely judge-made—
there is not, and never has been, a first-sale patent statute.48
36. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
37. DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN
SOLVE IT 21 (2009).
38. Id.; see also Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1155, 1159 (2002) (“While the nature of the patent system went through some rather
dramatic changes in the first fifty years of the Republic . . . by 1836 the essential features of modern
patent law were in place. Despite periodic revisions . . . the basic structure of the patent system has
remained unchanged for 165 years.” (footnote omitted)).
39. The Supreme Court has referred to patent owners’ rights as “the exclusive right to make
and use their patented inventions.” Mitchell v. Hawley, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 544, 546 (1872). But the term
“exclusive right” is a bit misleading. The reality is that a patent “confers no affirmative right,” but
rather, “confer[s] only the right to exclude others.” BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 37, at 16; see also 35
U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2012) (“the right to exclude others”).
40. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 37, at 37.
41. United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 278 (1942); BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 37,
at 37 (“There is virtually unanimous agreement that the purpose of the patent system is to promote
innovation by granting exclusive rights to encourage invention.”).
42. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1).
43. Id. § 281.
44. Id. §§ 283–284.
45. ExcelStor Tech., Inc. v. Papst Licensing GMBH & Co. KG, 541 F.3d 1373, 1376 (Fed. Cir.
2008).
46. Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761, 1766 (2013). Importantly, however, the doctrine
does not exhaust the patent owner’s right to prevent others from “making” the item. Id.
47. See id.
48. Chiappetta, supra note 1, at 1088 n.3. Interestingly, Congress has codified the first-sale
doctrine in the copyright context. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2012). A discussion of why Congress has codified
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Bloomer v. McQuewan

Courts and scholars49 generally trace the first-sale doctrine to the midnineteenth-century case of Bloomer v. McQuewan.50 The Court’s rationale in Bloomer
lies at the core of the modern first-sale doctrine.51 Quite simply, because a purchaser
has a right to use his purchased articles, the Court will limit the patent owner’s ability
to control the purchaser’s post-sale use.52
In Bloomer, petitioner Bloomer, a successor in interest to the famous
Woodworth planing machine patent,53 sued to enjoin McQuewan, a licensee, as well
as other licensees, from using the planing machines during the seven-year patent
extension provided by Congress in 1845.54 McQuewan had purchased the right to
make and use a limited number of planing machines,55 but Bloomer argued that
such rights did not extend to the 1845 patent extension.56
The Court ruled for McQuewan.57 The Court held that “when the machine
passes to the hands of the purchaser, it is no longer within the limits of the [patent]
monopoly.”58 The machine “becomes [the purchaser’s] private, individual

the doctrine for copyright law, but not patent law, is beyond the scope of this Note. It will suffice to
say that the Copyright Act has a unique legislative history and that copyright “must address the
significant free speech issues” not present in the patent context. See Chiappetta, supra note 1, at 1087
n.1 (citation omitted).
49. See Quanta Comput., Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 625 (2008) (citing Bloomer); Server
& Casey, supra note 15, at 564 (“Bloomer v. McQuewan is generally acknowledged as the Court’s first
application of the patent exhaustion doctrine . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
50. Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 539 (1852). Professor Mark Janis has rightfully
noted, however, that “glimmers of the exhaustion doctrine can be detected” in the earlier case of Wilson
v. Rousseau. Mark D. Janis, A Tale of the Apocryphal Axe: Repair, Reconstruction, and the Implied License in
Intellectual Property Law, 58 MD. L. REV. 423, 432 (1999). Rousseau involved whether licensees could use
the patent during the patent extension of 1836. Wilson v. Rousseau, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 646, 669 (1846).
The Court held they could, id. at 684, as the statutory language provided the extension “shall extend to
assignees and grantees . . . to use the thing patented,” id. at 677 (emphasis omitted). But the Court’s
reasoning lies at the core of the first-sale doctrine: “[I]f the construction [were otherwise] . . . the
common use [would be] arrested . . . . [a result] never contemplated by Congress.” Id. at 684; see also
Janis, supra, at 433.
51. See Quanta, 553 U.S. at 625 (finding modern support for the doctrine in Bloomer).
52. Id. (citing Bloomer, 55 U.S. (14 How.) at 549).
53. Professor Janis explains that the Woodworth patent “dominated the marketplace,” leading
to over one thousand licenses and over a dozen Supreme Court cases. Janis, supra note 50, at 429.
54. Bloomer, 55 U.S. (14 How.) at 539–40, 547. In 1836, Congress granted a seven-year patent
extension to any patent owner who could properly demonstrate that he had not received sufficient
compensation for the development costs of his patent. Patent Act of 1836, ch. 306, § 18, 5 Stat. 117,
124–25. This patent extension expressly applied to grantees, hence the holding of Wilson v. Rousseau. See
supra note 50. In 1845, Congress extended the patent term for an additional seven years. Bloomer, 55
U.S. (14 How.) at 547. Because this second extension did not expressly include grantees, id. at 542, the
Court in Bloomer could not rely on the statutory language, and instead established the first-sale doctrine,
id. at 551–52.
55. Id. at 548.
56. Id. at 542, 548.
57. Id. at 551–52.
58. Id. at 549.
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property,” and therefore, McQuewan and the other licensees “must be entitled to
continue the use” of the machines.59
Bloomer is important in demonstrating that the Court does not hold intellectual
property rights in a higher regard than traditional property rights. Rather, the Court
will treat intellectual property similar to any other form of personal property.60 And
the Court has traditionally been reluctant to allow servitudes in personal property.61
Servitudes hinder the free use and alienability of personal property,62 which in turn
restrain commerce and free competition.63 Bloomer thus represents a policy decision
by the Court not to allow intellectual property to diminish the rights of personal
property owners.
2.

Adams v. Burke

Adams v. Burke—arguably the most fundamental case in understanding the
Court’s jurisprudence—greatly elaborates on the first-sale doctrine.64 Adams stands
for the proposition that, for exhaustion to occur, a patent owner must have received
full compensation.65 Such compensation, in general, is received through an initial,
authorized sale.66 However, Adams is clear that application of the first-sale doctrine
requires ad hoc consideration, due to the important pecuniary and policy interests at
stake.67
In 1863, Merrill & Horner received a patent on an improvement in coffin
lids.68 Merrill & Horner assigned Lockhart & Seelye the exclusive rights to the patent

59. Id. at 550–51. Interestingly, the majority could have discussed the conditional-sale theory,
discussed in Section I.B., infra, but did not. The majority considered whether a purchaser for value has
full rights to a purchased article. Id. at 549. But McQuewan’s purchase actually included a use restriction.
The contract expressly permitted usage only until 1842—the duration of the patent prior to the 1845
patent extension. Id. at 555 (McLean, J., dissenting). However, the Court did not discuss the use
restriction. Because the patent, absent the 1845 extension, would have expired in 1842, the purchaser
would have expected to retain use of the articles even after the contract’s 1842 expiration. Id. at 556
(“[I]t is answered, that the assignee expected to run his machine after the termination of the contract
on which the exclusive right would end and become vested in the public.”). In other words, the Court
did not view the contractual restriction in this case as something that the parties had bargained for.
60. See United States v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 128 U.S. 315, 370 (1888) (stating “[t]his is property,”
in reference to the patent right); Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L.
REV. 1031, 1031 (2005) (“Congress, the courts, and commentators increasingly treat intellectual
property . . . as a good in and of itself.”).
61. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The
Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 18 & n.68 (2000).
62. Amelia Smith Rinehart, Contracting Patents: A Modern Patent Exhaustion Doctrine, 23 HARV. J.L.
& TECH. 483, 484, 492 (2010).
63. Gerald R. Gibbons, Field Restrictions in Patent Transactions: Economic Discrimination and Restraint
of Competition, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 423, 431 (1966).
64. Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 453 (1873).
65. Id. at 456.
66. Id. (noting that, “in the essential nature of things,” the sale of a machine is considered full
consideration).
67. Id. at 455.
68. Id. at 453–54.
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within ten miles of the city of Boston.69 Merrill & Horner then assigned the
remainder—i.e., exclusive rights outside ten miles of Boston—to Adams.70 Adams
sued Burke, an undertaker, who had purchased the invention from Lockhart &
Seelye, but had then used it in Adams’ territory seventeen miles from Boston.71
The Court began its opinion by expressly noting that it was ruling ad hoc. The
Court explained that “[t]he vast pecuniary results involved in such cases, as well as
the public interest, admonish us to proceed with care, and to decide in each case no
more than what is directly in issue.”72
The Court then ruled that the patent rights were exhausted under the first-sale
doctrine.73 The Court declared that “in the essential nature of things,” when the
patent owner—or a person having her rights—sells the invention, she receives “all
the royalty or consideration” for the sold item.74 And having received her full
consideration, the patent owner “parts with the right to restrict [the item’s] use.”75
The Court acknowledged that the assignee—Lockhart & Seelye—was not
authorized to sell the coffins outside ten miles of Boston.76 But the Court held that
neither the patent statute nor the contract allowed the Court to imply this limitation
onto Burke77—Burke was under no express restriction.78
Adams v. Burke establishes four important points that were not expressed in
Bloomer. First, while Bloomer emphasizes the Court’s reluctance to allow servitudes in
personal property, Adams explains an alternative reason for the doctrine: a patent
owner should not be permitted to “double dip,” i.e., collect more than her fair
reward.79 Adams is clear, however, that the patent owner must receive full consideration
to have received her reward.80 The Court explained that, “in the essential nature of
things”—i.e., in the usual scenario where the price demanded is sufficient to
compensate the patent owner81—the patent owner receives full consideration
simply in selling the item.82
Second, Adams explains that restrictions cannot be implied from the
circumstances. Even if Burke had discovered the Lockhart & Seelye restriction,
Burke could still use the lids as he pleased; after all, he was under no express

69. Id. at 454.
70. Id.
71. See id.
72. Id. at 455.
73. Id. at 457.
74. Id. at 456.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 456–57.
78. Id. at 455.
79. Id. at 456; see also Rogers, supra note 10, at 443 (noting that “patent royalty double-dipping”
is what “the principle of patent exhaustion serves to prevent”).
80. Adams, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) at 456.
81. See Chiappetta, supra note 1, at 1094.
82. Adams, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) at 456.
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restriction.83 While servitudes in real property typically require either (i) actual, (ii)
implied, or (iii) constructive notice,84 Adams makes clear that, in the patent context,
implied notice is not sufficient.85 Of course, Adams does not tell us whether actual
notice would have been sufficient—but it does leave open that possibility. Third,
Adams explains that exhaustion can only occur through an authorized sale, i.e., a
sale made by the patent owner or someone having her rights.86 This rule prevents
the sale of stolen or counterfeit items from triggering the doctrine.87
Last, and most importantly, Adams establishes that the first-sale doctrine
requires ad hoc consideration.88 The pecuniary interests at stake and the public
interest deserve such a case-by-case consideration.89 By using the language “in the
essential nature of things,”90 the Court directly leaves open the possibility that
special cases might arise that warrant a different result than the one in Adams.
Overall, Adams v. Burke establishes the core tenets of the first-sale doctrine:
that the first authorized sale generally exhausts a patent owner’s rights to the items
sold. Adams is considered the foundational case upon which future cases rely.91
B. The Rise of the Conditional-Sale Theory—and the Logic Behind It
The conditional-sale theory—i.e., the notion that post-sale use restrictions are
enforceable—first developed in the late nineteenth century with the Supreme
Court’s decision in Mitchell v. Hawley.92 Soon after, in the early twentieth century, the
Court in Henry v. A.B. Dick Co. expressly enforced such restrictions—the high point
in the doctrine’s jurisprudence.93 The Court engaged in a detailed analysis of the
doctrine and cogently explained its rationale.94
Ultimately, in 1917, the Supreme Court in Motion Picture Patents overruled A.B.
Dick.95 However, it is important to recognize that Motion overruled A.B. Dick for

83. Id. at 455.
84. Chiappetta, supra note 1, at 1126.
85. Adams, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) at 457. Further, constructive notice will not suffice, as records are
not generally created for sales of patented items. Chiappetta, supra note 1, at 1127.
86. Adams, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) at 456. Adams, however, was not the first case to set forth this
rule. E.g., Chaffee v. Bos. Belting Co., 63 U.S. (22 How.) 217, 224 (1859) (first-sale doctrine did not
apply without authorized sale).
87. See Chaffee, 63 U.S. (22 How.) at 224 (“[Purchasers must] ha[ve] a title to [the patented
article], and [be] rightfully in the use of it under that title . . . .”).
88. Adams, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) at 455.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 456.
91. See United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 493–94 (1926) (describing the Court’s
more recent cases involving post-sale use restrictions as an “application of the principle of Adams v.
Burke”).
92. Mitchell v. Hawley, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 544, 547 (1872).
93. Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 49 (1912), overruled in part by Motion Picture Patents Co.
v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917).
94. Id. at 23–49.
95. Motion, 243 U.S. at 518.
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specific statutory reasons,96 and thus did not eliminate the conditional-sale theory
in its entirety. In fact, Motion respected A.B. Dick’s reasoning, but found such
reasoning inconsistent with Congress’s intentions.97 A.B. Dick, therefore, is crucial
in understanding the Court’s modern jurisprudence.
From a policy perspective, the conditional-sale theory champions the ability
of parties to contract.98 Voluntary transactions are said to be economically efficient
so long as the parties have notice of all conditions.99 In these transactions, the
parties will negotiate a price that reflects the value of the conferred use rights.100 As
a result, the purchaser is more likely to be willing to purchase the item.101 For
example, a purchaser may prefer to purchase an item with restrictions because,
without restrictions, the price may be substantially higher.102 If the first-sale
doctrine prevents patent owners from implementing use restrictions, then fewer
purchasers may be able to purchase patented items.
1.

Origins of the Conditional-Sale Theory—Mitchell v. Hawley

In Mitchell v. Hawley, the Court first described the conditional-sale theory.103
Mitchell did not actually involve a conditional sale, as the restriction was not on a
purchaser, but a licensee.104 But Mitchell is important in that it expressly sets up the
conditional-sale theory in dictum; this language has never been expressly challenged
or criticized by the Court.105
Mitchell involved a patent owner, Taylor, who received a patent in 1853 on an
improvement in machinery for felting hats.106 In 1860, Taylor granted a license to
Bayley, granting Bayley the exclusive right to make and use the invention in
Massachusetts and New Hampshire as well as to license others to use the
invention.107 Taylor’s patent originally was to expire in 1867.108 Taylor expressly

96. Id. at 515–16; see also infra Section II.A.2.
97. Motion, 243 U.S. at 516 (calling A.B. Dick’s reasoning a “plausible argument”).
98. See Chiappetta, supra note 1, at 1119.
99. See Arno, supra note 1, at 282.
100. B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1426 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
101. Mark R. Patterson, Must Licenses Be Contracts? Consent and Notice in Intellectual Property, 40 FLA.
ST. L. REV. 105, 157 (2012).
102. See id.
103. Mitchell v. Hawley, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 544, 547 (1872).
104. Id. at 549.
105. However, almost by definition, the dictum in Mitchell must be considered greatly limited
as a result of the partial overruling of A.B. Dick. This is especially true considering that A.B. Dick
extensively relied on the pertinent language in Mitchell. Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 19-22 (1912),
overruled in part by Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917). Notably,
the recent Quanta decision makes no mention of Mitchell, which supports the idea that Mitchell’s holding
has been circumscribed. The fate of Mitchell is identical to the fate of A.B. Dick—circumscribed, but
still applicable.
106. Mitchell, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 548.
107. Id. at 545.
108. Id.
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provided, in the license, that Bayley would not license any rights that would extend
beyond 1867.109
In 1864, Bayley licensed to Mitchell the right to use four felting machines.110
But this license to Mitchell was unrestricted in time, contrary to the terms of the
license between Taylor and Bayley.111 Taylor’s patent was ultimately extended
beyond 1867, and respondent Hawley obtained the rights to the patent in
Massachusetts.112 Hawley sued Mitchell for patent infringement.113
The Court ruled for Hawley.114 The Court declared, “Nemo dat quod non habet ”
(no one may give what he does not have).115 Specifically, because Bayley had no
right to license the invention after 1867, Bayley could not convey such a right to
Mitchell.116 Interestingly, the Court stated that “[n]otice to the purchaser in such a
case is not required, as the law imposes the risk upon the purchaser.”117 The Court
noted that “[c]ertain exceptions undoubtedly exist to th[is] rule, but none of them
have any application to this case” because the purchaser was on notice of the
restriction.118
In dictum, the Court made two things clear. First, patent owners may place
conditions on sales to purchasers. Second, exhaustion only applies to unconditional
sales.
Patented implements or machines sold to be used in the ordinary pursuits

109. Id. This restriction appears similar to the restriction in Bloomer. Cf. Bloomer v. McQuewan,
55 U.S. (14 How.) 539, 555 (1852) (McLean, J., dissenting). In both instances, the patent owner arranged
for a contract to expire on the same date that the patent expired. And both times, Congress extended
the patent, and the patent owners wanted their rights back. In Bloomer, the dissent contended that a
patent extension was foreseeable. Id. at 556. To the dissent, the contract’s termination date clearly
evidenced a use restriction that had been freely negotiated. Id. (“[W]hen he entered into the contract he
knew, or is presumed to have known, that the patent might be extended . . . by special act, and if he
desired an interest under the renewed patent, he should have provided for it in his contract.”). Justice
McLean concluded the patent owner had been cheated. Id. (“[I]t would seem to be unjust that, under a
contract to run the machine less than ten years, he should be entitled to run it sixteen years.”). But the
Bloomer majority assumed that the parties had not foreseen the patent extension. See id. at 556 (discussing
the majority’s position that “the assignee expected to run his machine after the termination of the
contract on which the exclusive right would end and become vested in the public”). In other words,
the majority assumed that the patent owner had been paid in full. And as such, we do not know what
the result would have been had the use restriction been considered seriously. In Mitchell, the Court could
have ignored the question, just like it did in Bloomer. But instead, the Court expressly stated in dictum
that a patent owner’s conditions have legal significance. Mitchell, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 548.
110. Id. at 546.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 551.
115. Id. at 550.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. The Court did not state, or even hint at, what these exceptions might be. The
subsequent case of Henry v. A.B. Dick, however, makes clear that, where the sale is authorized, a
purchaser must receive notice of all conditions. Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 26 (1912), overruled
in part by Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917).
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of life become the private individual property of the purchasers . . . . Sales
of the kind may be made by the patentee with or without conditions, as in
other cases, but where the sale is absolute, and without any conditions, [the
patent owner’s right is exhausted].119
This language leaves little doubt that patent owners are permitted to place
conditions on sold articles. However, the Court did not explain the reasoning
behind the conditional-sale theory, and it did not discuss the limits of the theory. It
was not until nearly forty years later that the Court squarely answered these
questions.
2.

The Zenith—Henry v. A.B. Dick

In Henry v. A.B. Dick, the Supreme Court, for the first time, explained and
interpreted the conditional-sale theory. The Court gave the theory broad—nearly
limitless—scope, holding that any use restriction could be enforced so long as the
purchaser had received notice.120
As discussed in Section II, A.B. Dick was ultimately overruled and the scope
of its doctrine considerably narrowed. However, as explained in Section III, the core
of the A.B. Dick decision remains good law—namely, that use restrictions, in some
circumstances, are enforceable and that purchasers must have notice of those
restrictions to be held liable.
In A.B. Dick, complainant A.B. Dick owned a patent on a “stencil-duplicating
machine known as the ‘Rotary Mimeograph.’”121 A.B. Dick sold one such
mimeograph to Christina Skou, and affixed a notice stating that the mimeograph
could only be used with paper, ink, and other supplies made by A.B. Dick.122 Sidney
Henry of the Henry Company (an ink manufacturer) sold ink to Ms. Skou even
though Henry had knowledge of A.B. Dick’s license agreement.123 A.B. Dick sued
Henry for patent infringement.124
The Court ruled in favor of A.B. Dick, stating that any “reasonable stipulation,
not inherently violative of some substantive law, imposed by a patentee as part of a
sale of a patented machine, would be . . . valid and enforceable.”125 The Court, in a
119. Mitchell, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 548.
120. A.B. Dick, 224 U.S. at 39, 49.
121. Id. at 11.
122. Id. at 39, 49. This type of use restriction is called a “tying” restriction: the use of an
unpatented item is “tied” to the use of a patented item. After Motion Picture Patents overruled A.B. Dick,
tying restrictions became unlawful per se, under a separate patent doctrine called the “misuse” doctrine.
The rationale was that a patent owner, by implementing a tying restriction, “misused” the patent because
the owner gained control over unpatented items. Recently, in 1988, Congress amended 35 U.S.C. §
271(d), mandating that tying restrictions are not per se unlawful, but rather are lawful restrictions unless
the patent owner has market power and the restrictions have anticompetitive effects. Act of Nov. 19,
1988, tit. II, Pub. No. 100-703, § 201, 102 Stat. 4674. The Court’s holding in A.B. Dick affected both
the misuse doctrine and the first-sale doctrine. See infra text accompanying notes 149-53.
123. A.B. Dick, 224 U.S. at 11 (majority opinion); id. at 51 (White, J., dissenting).
124. Id. at 14 (majority opinion).
125. Id. at 31.
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lengthy opinion, provided three distinct reasons for this result.126 First, the Court
noted that the use of a patented machine is often more valuable to the patent owner
than the mere value of the machine, and therefore the patent owner has a right to
restrict such use.127 For support, the Court cited to circuit courts and English cases
that had expressly recognized the patent owner’s ability to create use restrictions.128
The Court heavily cited the dictum in Mitchell v. Hawley as well.129
Second, the Court justified use restrictions by noting that a patent owner has
the ability to restrict the use of the patent entirely by choosing to sell to no one.130
As Professor Hovenkamp explains, a use restriction is a type of output reduction.131
Because a patent owner has the ability to limit output all the way down to zero, it
makes sense to allow the patent owner to reduce output to some point more than
zero, but less than one hundred.132 A.B. Dick did not have to let anyone use its
mimeographs, so it certainly could allow customers to use the mimeographs for
limited purposes.133
Third, the Court considered why Bobbs-Merrill v. Straus,134 a copyright case, was
not controlling.135 Bobbs-Merrill involved a “resale” restriction—the copyright owner
of a novel sought to prohibit purchasers from reselling the novel for less than one
dollar.136 Bobbs-Merrill found the restriction unenforceable, holding that Congress
did not intend to allow copyright owners to control future sales.137 Bobbs-Merrill
distinguished the earlier case of E. Bement & Sons—a contract case involving a
restriction against a patent licensee138—on the notion that applying patent law to

126. Id. at 23–49. Before the Court even arrived at the question of use restrictions, it first had
to respond to Henry’s contention that the matter was outside the Court’s jurisdiction. Id. at 13–14. The
Court found it had jurisdiction, as “some right or privilege will be defeated by one construction [of the
patent laws], [but] sustained by another [construction] of those laws[.]” Id. at 16. Enforcement of use
restrictions, therefore, is a federal question—this holding of A.B. Dick has never been challenged by
the Court.
127. Id. at 25 (“[T]he mere value of a patented machine is often, as is proved to be in this case,
insignificant in comparison with the value of its use . . . .” (quoting Porter Needle Co. v. Nat’l Needle
Co., 17 F. 536 (D. Mass. 1883))).
128. Id. at 37–43.
129. Id. at 19–22. In addition, the Court cited to a leading treatise for the proposition that “any
person having the right to sell may at the time of sale restrict the use of his vendee.” Id. at 24 (quoting
2 WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS § 824 (Boston, Little,
Brown & Co. 1890)).
130. Id. at 32. The ability of a patent owner to withhold use of her invention entirely had
previously been determined by the Court. Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 429
(1908).
131. Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Sale Restraints and Competitive Harm: The First Sale Doctrine in
Perspective, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 487, 529 (2011).
132. Id. at 529–30.
133. See A.B. Dick, 224 U.S. at 32.
134. Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908).
135. A.B. Dick, 224 U.S. at 43–45.
136. Bobbs-Merrill, 210 U.S. at 341.
137. Id. at 350–51.
138. Id. at 345.
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copyright law might “greatly embarrass the consideration of a [future patent]
case.”139
The Court in A.B. Dick determined that this “[future patent] case” was, in fact,
the present case. The Court explained that Bobbs-Merrill had rightly distinguished
Bement, as patent law is very different than copyright law.140 Specifically, the patent
statute grants the exclusive right to make, sell, and use the patented item; by contrast,
the copyright statute grants the exclusive right to make and sell the copyrighted
work, but not to use it.141 The Court concluded, for this reason, that Bobbs-Merrill
did not control the present case.142
As a final matter, the Court established the requirement that a purchaser
“must have notice” of the use restriction for it to be enforceable.143 The Court
explained that a purchaser “has a right to assume, in the absence of knowledge, that
the seller passes an unconditional title to the machine, with no limitations upon the
use.”144 This holding is critical in that it ensures that innocent purchasers will not
be held liable for patent infringement. Such protection is a major theme of the law
of servitudes. Property law generally permits servitudes in real property—but not in
personal property—because purchasers are much better able to identify servitudes
in real property than in personal property. In other words, purchasers should not
be caught unawares. Here, by requiring notice, the Court justified allowing
servitudes in patented personal property.
Overall, it appears clear that the conditional-sale theory had reached its zenith
by 1912. Adams v. Burke had implied that use restrictions might be enforceable.
Mitchell v. Hawley had said so in dictum. And A.B. Dick then expressly, and in depth,
explained why courts should enforce use restrictions. Not surprisingly, the Court’s
subsequent overruling of A.B. Dick greatly limited the conditional-sale theory. But,
as discussed below in Section II, the Court overruled A.B. Dick for one specific
reason: Congress did not intend for patent owners to implement use restrictions for
personal gain.145 This reason is critically important. With this reason in mind,
Section III then explains that certain use restrictions would not violate Congress’s
intent.146 These use restrictions are enforceable, notwithstanding the demise of the
A.B. Dick era.
II. THE ARRIVAL OF THE SINGLE-ROYALTY THEORY
A. The Demise of the Conditional-Sale Theory
The conditional-sale theory had reached its height in 1912. The theory was
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id.
A.B. Dick, 224 U.S. at 45–47.
Id. at 46.
Id.
Id. at 26.
Id.
See infra Section II.A.2.
See infra Section III.A.
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supported by the Supreme Court’s earlier jurisprudence, and the rationale behind it
was cogent. However, just a mere year later in Bauer & Cie v. O’Donnell, the Supreme
Court began to chip away at the theory, holding that restrictions on the right to
“sell” were unenforceable.147 In 1917, the Court in Motion Picture Patents extended
this holding to restrictions on “use” and expressly overruled Henry v. A.B. Dick.148
Some scholars, however, have attempted to save the conditional-sale theory.
They argue that A.B. Dick was only overruled under the doctrine of “patent
misuse.”149 Specifically, A.B. Dick had permitted use restrictions called “tying”
restrictions.150 Motion also involved tying restrictions, and Bauer involved resale
restrictions.151 These sorts of restrictions, for many years after Motion, would be held
by the Court to be per se patent misuse.152
The argument is that because A.B. Dick, Bauer, and Motion all turned on patent
misuse, A.B. Dick must therefore still be good law to the extent that a patent owner
does not implement use restrictions to further patent misuse. In other words, use
restrictions that are properly within the patent’s scope are enforceable. The Federal
Circuit in particular—beginning with Mallinckrodt—appears to have adopted this
reasoning.153
However, this argument fails for two reasons. First, it is clear that Motion
overruled A.B. Dick, not only on misuse grounds, but also because the Court found
the conditional-sale theory inconsistent with the will of Congress.154 In fact, Motion
expressly stated that its ruling would affect “the extent to which a patentee . . . [may]
prescribe . . . the conditions of [a patented article’s] use.”155 In other words, Motion
intended to limit the conditional-sale theory.
Second, the Court’s explanation of the first-sale doctrine in subsequent cases
cannot be aligned with the conditional-sale theory. The Court in multiple cases,
most recently in Quanta v. LG Electronics, uses strong language that evidences the
demise of the conditional-sale theory.156 That language strongly supports the rise of
147. Bauer & Cie v. O’Donnell, 229 U.S. 1, 16–18 (1913).
148. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 516, 518 (1917).
149. See, e.g., Yina Dong, Note, A Patent Exhaustion Exposition: Situating Quanta v. LGE in the
Context of Supreme Court Jurisprudence, 2010 STAN. TECH. L. REV. N2, ¶ 48 (2010); see also Gomulkiewicz,
supra note 21, at 228 (finding that conditions are enforceable, but are subject to the misuse doctrine);
Austin, supra note 7, at 2980 (finding that “beyond the antitrust and patent misuse laws” parties have
the freedom to contract).
150. See supra notes 149–50 and accompanying text.
151. Motion, 243 U.S. at 506; Bauer, 229 U.S. at 8.
152. Dong, supra note 149, ¶ 38; see also supra notes 149–50 and accompanying text.
153. See Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 708 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
154. Motion, 243 U.S. at 516.
155. Id. at 509.
156. Quanta Comput., Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 625–26 (2008) (“Although the
Court permitted postsale restrictions on the use of a patented article in Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S.
1 (1912), that decision was short lived.” (footnote omitted)); United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S.
241, 251 (1942) (“[T]he patentee has received his reward for the use of his invention by the sale of the
article, and . . . once that purpose is realized the patent law affords no basis for restraining the use and
enjoyment of the thing sold.”); Bos. Store of Chi. v. Am. Graphophone Co., 246 U.S. 8, 25 (1918)
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the “single royalty” theory—the idea that a patent owner must receive her entire
reward through the initial sale.
1.

Chipping Away—Bauer & Cie v. O’Donnell

In Bauer & Cie v. O’Donnell, complainant Bauer & Cie (Bauer) owned a patent
on the vitamin Sanatogen, which it provided to its agent Hehmeyer through a
license.157 The license allowed Hehmeyer to set the price at which purchasers could
resell purchased Sanatogen.158 When defendant O’Donnell purchased and sold
Sanatogen for less than the provided resale price, Bauer sued O’Donnell.159
The Court ruled for O’Donnell.160 The Court stated that “care should be taken
not to extend by judicial construction the rights and privileges which it was the
purpose of Congress to bestow.”161 Citing Bobbs-Merrill, the Court noted that “[t]he
sale of a patented article is not essentially different from the sale of a book.”162 Like
in Bobbs-Merrill, the Court determined that fixing the resale price would go “beyond
[the statute’s] fair meaning and secure privileges not intended to be covered by the
act of Congress.”163
Bauer makes clear that once a purchaser “has paid to the [patentee] the full
price asked for the article sold,” the patent owner cannot then seek to control future
sales; doing so would go beyond Congress’s intentions.164 Although the Court
distinguished A.B. Dick—noting that, unlike the present case, the sale in A.B. Dick
transferred only a “qualified title,” it set the stage to overrule A.B. Dick four years
later.165
2.

A.B. Dick’s Downfall—Motion Picture Patents

Motion Picture Patents involved a patent on a mechanism for showing motion
pictures.166 The patent owner granted a licensee the right to make and sell the

(“[O]ne who had sold a patented machine and received the price . . . could not, by qualifying restrictions
as to use, keep under the patent monopoly a subject to which the monopoly no longer applied.”).
Professor Chiappetta notes that many of the Court’s exhaustion statements are technically dicta, but
explains that these statements are necessary to understand “the full operation of the doctrine.”
Chiappetta, supra note 1, at 1107 n.105.
157. Bauer & Cie v. O’Donnell, 229 U.S. 1, 8 (1913).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 9.
160. Id. at 18.
161. Id. at 10.
162. Id. at 13.
163. Id. at 12.
164. Id. at 11.
165. Id. at 15. Of course, this finding—that sales with restrictions on use convey only a qualified
title—cannot be used to save the conditional-sale theory. Bauer preceded Motion, and therefore, had to
distinguish itself from A.B. Dick. Bauer did so by finding a difference between restrictions on “sell” and
restrictions on “use.” Id. But Motion expressly holds that use restrictions are “precisely the same” as
resale restrictions. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 516 (1917).
166. Motion, 243 U.S. at 505.
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invention.167 Under this license, the licensee had to notify any purchasers that (1)
the invention could only be used to show the patent owner’s motion pictures (i.e.,
a tying restriction) and (2) the purchaser needed to contact the patent owner to
discover “other terms to be . . . complied with by the user.”168 The defendants
violated the terms of the notice, and the patent owner sued for patent
infringement.169
The Court ruled for the defendants.170 The Court first made clear that its
holding would affect both (a) the conditional-sale theory and (b) the misuse
doctrine:
It is obvious that in this case we have presented anew the inquiry, which is
arising with increasing frequency in recent years, as to the extent to which
a patentee or his assignee is authorized by our patent laws to prescribe by
notice attached to a patented machine [(a)] the conditions of its use and
[(b)] the supplies which must be used in the operation of it, under pain of
infringement of the patent.171
The Court resolved these issues by analyzing “three rules [of statutory
interpretation] long established by this court, applicable to the patent law.”172 The
Court used the first two rules to find the tying restriction impermissible under the
doctrine of patent misuse.173 The third rule, however, directly implicated the
conditional-sale theory.
This third rule involved Congress’s rationale behind the Patent Act. The Court
explained that the “primary purpose of our patent laws is not the creation of private
fortunes for the owners of patents,” but is rather “to promote the progress of
science and useful arts.”174 The Court accepted that patent owners should be “fairly,
even liberally treated,” but urged that Congress primarily intended to use the patent
owner’s “reward,” to foster innovation.175
The Court acknowledged that A.B. Dick’s major justification for the
conditional-sale theory—that the ability to restrict all use warrants, a fortiori, the
ability to restrict some use—was a “plausible argument.”176 But the Court said: “The
167. Id. at 506.
168. Id. Per the license, these “other terms” were solely regarding royalty payment. Id. The Court
had previously held that violation of royalty terms do not warrant an infringement suit. Henry v. A.B.
Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 16 (1912), overruled in part by Motion, 243 U.S. 502. But the Court refers to these
terms as “terms not stated in the notice,” Motion, 243 U.S. at 509, without mention of royalties. The
Court’s wording thus appears to treat this provision as one warranting an infringement suit.
169. Motion, 243 U.S. at 507.
170. Id. at 519.
171. Id. at 509 (emphasis added). Motion, of course, did not expressly use the phrase “misuse
doctrine” because that doctrine did not exist yet. Rather, Motion is credited for establishing the misuse
doctrine. Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“The doctrine of
patent misuse . . . beg[an] with the 1917 decision in Motion Picture Patents . . . .” (citation omitted)).
172. Motion, 243 U.S. at 510.
173. See id. at 510–11.
174. Id. at 511 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
175. See id.
176. Id. at 516. In other words, the Court acknowledged that A.B. Dick’s reasoning was sound.
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defect in this thinking springs from the substituting of inference and argument for
the language of the statute . . . .”177 The Court, citing Bauer, then said that the
“statutory authority to grant the exclusive right to ‘use’ a patented machine is not
greater, indeed it is precisely the same, as the authority to grant the exclusive right to
‘vend.’”178 In other words, while Bauer held that “sell” restrictions went beyond
Congress’s intentions, Motion now extended that holding to “use” restrictions.
The Court then concluded: “It is obvious that . . . Henry v. [A.B.] Dick Co. must
be regarded as overruled.”179 This holding makes clear that the conditional-sale
theory—at least in its original form as expressed in A.B. Dick—is at an end.
Conditional sales, in general, are simply inconsistent with Congress’s intentions: the
Patent Act was not designed to enhance patent owners’ fortunes.180
However, as discussed in Section III, the Court did not completely eliminate
the conditional-sale theory. Motion placed significant weight on the fact that the
patent owner’s reward must serve to innovate science, noting that the patent owner
must be “fairly, even liberally, treated.”181 And Motion, at bottom, was concerned
with the intent of Congress. It appears fairly clear, then, that a use condition required
for scientific innovation would survive the Court’s scrutiny.182
B. The Single-Royalty Theory—the Purchase Price Is the Entire Reward.
The single-royalty theory arose from the ashes of the conditional-sale theory.
After Motion, patent owners could no longer implement use restrictions to receive
their reward. As a result, these owners had to receive their entire reward for a
patented item through its purchase price—i.e., a single royalty. Under this “single
royalty” theory, payment of the purchase price exhausts the patent owner’s rights
to the article sold.183
One criticism of the single-royalty theory is that the theory limits the patent
owner’s reward by removing the ability of the parties to contract.184 For example,
this Note’s Introduction depicted a bicycle patent owner who struggled to make

177. Id. at 514.
178. Id. at 516 (emphasis added).
179. Id. at 518 (citation omitted).
180. Last, the Court then moved on to discuss the license’s second provision: that the purchaser
was bound by “other terms” not stated in the license. Id. The Court discussed the public interest. It
noted that Motion had already received over $200,000 through the patent. Id. Any further restriction
would grant “such a potential power for evil over an industry which must be recognized as an important
element in the amusement life of the nation.” Id. at 519. Such a restriction would be “gravely injurious
to th[e] public interest, which we have seen is more a favorite of the law than is the promotion of private
fortunes.” Id. This ad hoc analysis— comparing the patentee’s reward to the public interest—lies at the
core of the first-sale doctrine. See infra Section III.A.1.
181. Motion, 243 U.S. at 511.
182. See infra Section III.
183. Chiappetta, supra note 1, at 1123.
184. Id. at 1104.
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sales without implementing a use restriction.185 To the patent owner, the use
restriction was just as important as, if not more important than, the purchase price.
The Court has made clear, however, that patent owners are not receiving less
than their fair reward.186 Rather, the purchase price is the value of their reward. In
other words, the Court defines “reward” as the value received through the purchase
price—and not the full value that the patent owner could potentially receive via use
restrictions. In the bicycle example, the Court would say that if the patent owner
cannot make sufficient sales, then too bad—she deserves a smaller reward.
The Court most clearly expresses the single-royalty ideology in Motion:
[The single-royalty theory] is the fair as well as the statutory measure of
[the patent owner’s] reward for his contribution to the public stock of
knowledge. If his discovery is an important one his reward under such a
construction of the law will be large, as experience has abundantly proved,
and if it be unimportant he should not be permitted by legal devices to
impose an unjust charge upon the public in return for the use of it.187
The single-royalty theory thus provides adequate reward for a patent owner’s
contribution to society. The Court believes that such a result is not only supported
by the patent statute, but is also the “fair” result.188 But as discussed in the
Introduction, the single-royalty theory removes a patent owner’s ability to freely
negotiate and price discriminate.189 From a policy perspective, is the single-royalty
theory the preferable result?
As discussed below, there are significant policy justifications for the singleroyalty theory that strongly support the theory’s application in almost all cases.
These policy arguments can be divided into arguments regarding (1) rights, (2)
efficiency, and (3) the power of the Court. The first two categories focus on why
the single-royalty theory is the preferred result. The third category demonstrates
that, regardless, any change must be implemented by Congress, not the Court.
1.

Rights

The single-royalty theory protects the rights of the purchaser. While it is true—
as critics argue—that use restrictions are often freely bargained for, this “freely
bargained for” justification stands on a slippery slope. The justification assumes
that the purchaser has received a lower purchase price in exchange for accepting the
use restriction. In other words, the assumption is that if the purchase price = X
value, then the value of the use restrictions plus the new, lower purchase price also
= X value.
But that is not always the case. Say, for example, a patent owner develops a
novel invention that will sell for X value, but not more. Say also that purchasers
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

See supra Introduction.
Motion, 243 U.S. at 513.
Id.
Id.
See supra Introduction.
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cannot easily obtain the invention from other sources. In such a case, the patent
owner would be incentivized to tack on a few use restrictions for good measure, in
an attempt to enlarge her reward. Essentially, the use restrictions plus the purchase
price = more than X value.
The reality is that, while some purchasers would be able to bargain down the
purchase price, others likely would not. This reality is particularly true considering
that any use restriction would “run with the article”—remaining in effect as the item
moved from person to person over time.190 The first-sale doctrine thus protects
purchasers who do not have the ability to bargain.
Further, the patent owner, in theory, still receives an adequate reward. If we
assume that the patent owner lowered the purchase price to justify the use
restriction, then logically, she should be able to raise the price and remove the
restriction. Further, as noted above, the patent owner may still utilize use
restrictions; she will just need to receive her damages under a breach of contract
suit.191 The single-royalty theory thus protects purchasers while still meeting the
needs of patent owners.
2.

Efficiency

The single-royalty theory also encourages the influx of goods into the open
market, which encourages innovation and prevents waste. Allowing patent owners
to create servitudes in personal property would create artificial scarcity, which in
turn, would raise prices to supracompetitive levels.192
For example, imagine that a prospective purchaser wishes to buy a patented
article without any servitudes. The purchaser likely could not obtain such an article
from another consumer because any existing servitudes would run with the
article.193 Rather, the purchaser would need to purchase it directly from the patent
owner. The patent owner would likely be able to charge a high price because the
purchaser could not easily obtain the article elsewhere. The article has been sold for
more than it is worth.
Servitudes in personal property would also serve to hinder innovation.194
“User innovation”—that is, a purchaser’s ability to himself invent—requires that
the purchaser be allowed to manipulate and experiment with the articles around

190. See Chiappetta, supra note 1, at 1126. As discussed above, however, all patent owner must
take measures to ensure that all subsequent purchasers have notice of the restriction. Henry v. A.B.
Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 26 (1912), overruled in part by Motion, 243 U.S. 502.
191. See Austin, supra note 7.
192. Douglas Fretty, Note, Both a License and a Sale: How to Reconcile Self-Replicating Technology with
Patent Exhaustion, 5 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 1, 14 (2011).
193. See Chiappetta, supra note 1, at 1126.
194. See Ariel Katz, The First Sale Doctrine and the Economics of Post-Sale Restraints, 2014 BYU L.
REV. 55, 114–15.
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him.195 Requiring permission to use patented articles in certain ways would hinder
such innovation; free use is efficient use.196
Finally, use restrictions encourage waste. As Professor Chiappetta notes,
because purchasers will often have trouble reselling the burdened item, they are
likely to dispose of it instead.197 For example, in the bicycle example in this Note’s
introduction,198 purchasers were precluded from using sold bicycles after one year.
After a year, the purchasers would need to dispose of the still-working bicycle—an
inefficient use of a working article. Eliminating servitudes promotes efficiency.
3.

The Power of the Court

As demonstrated above, there are compelling policy justifications for the
single-royalty theory. However, it is undeniable that patent owners who strongly
value use restrictions are harmed. If we feel that patent owners deserve better,
should change be implemented through Congress or through the Court? The
answer is almost certainly through Congress. The Constitution directly empowers
Congress to grant patent owners with exclusive rights in order to encourage
innovation.
Congress, and not the Court, controls the extent of the patent owner’s
exclusive rights. The Court has absolutely no power to grant more rights than
bestowed by Congress. This is true even if policy justifications support increasing
that patent owner’s rights. The Court is limited to enforcing the will of Congress,
which as we have seen, requires no more than ensuring that innovation is fostered
to benefit the public interest.199
In Boston Store v. American Graphophone Co., the Court expressly noted that the
Court could not reach beyond the will of Congress to benefit patent owners.200 The
facts were very similar to those in Bauer v. O’Donnell.201 The complainant owned a
patent and attempted to control the price at which purchasers could resell the sold
patented articles.202 The Boston Store agreed to the provided resale provision but
failed to abide by it.203
In the resulting infringement lawsuit, the complainant urged the Supreme
Court that the single-royalty theory should not apply. The complainant stressed that

195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

Id. at 114.
See id. at 115.
Chiappetta, supra note 1, at 1128.
See supra Introduction.
Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 511 (1917).
See Bos. Store of Chi. v. Am. Graphophone Co., 246 U.S. 8, 26 (1918).
See supra Section II.A.1.
Bos. Store, 246 U.S. at 18–19.
Id. at 19–20.
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it valued the resale restriction much more highly then the gross consideration
price.204 This intent, the complainant argued, should resolve the case in its favor.205
The Court ruled for defendant Boston Store.206 The Court used particularly
strong language, making very clear that the single-royalty theory had usurped the
conditional-sale theory: “[O]ne who ha[s] sold a patented machine and received the
price . . . c[an] not, by qualifying restrictions as to use, keep [that machine] under
the patent monopoly . . . .”207 This holding constitutes “the fundamental ground
upon which, as we have seen, the decided cases must rest.”208
The Court then directly addressed the complainant’s argument that the use
restrictions were of substantial value. The Court acknowledged its ruling could
potentially cause “grave disaster . . . to the holders of patent rights.”209 But the Court
bluntly concluded: “[T]he remedy . . . is to be found, not in an attempt judicially to
correct doctrines which by reiterated decisions have become conclusively fixed, but
in invoking the curative power of legislation.”210
In other words, the Court in Bauer and Motion had clearly defined Congress’s
intent, and the Court in Graphophone was unable to deviate from that intent. The
abovementioned rights and efficiency arguments, therefore, are of little practical
interest to the Court. Rather, such issues must be addressed by Congress.211
C. A Modern Application—Quanta v. LGE
The Supreme Court’s most recent application of the single-royalty theory came
in the 2008 decision of Quanta v. LG Electronics.212 Before this point in time, the

204. Id. at 10. The Boston Store had also received “dealers’ discounts” in exchange for accepting
the license’s terms. Id. at 18.
205. See id. at 10.
206. Id. at 27.
207. Id. at 25.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 25–26.
210. Id. at 26.
211. Further, it is important to note that Congress’s intentions in this area did not change with
the implementation of the 1952 Patent Act. As Justice Black noted in his concurrence in Aro
Manufacturing Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co.:
[J]ust before the [1952 patent] bill was passed in the Senate, Senator Saltonstall asked on the
floor, “Does the bill change the law in any way or only codify the present patent laws?”
Senator McCarran, Chairman of the Judiciary Committee which had been in charge of the
bill for the Senate, replied, “It codifies the present patent laws.”
365 U.S. 336, 347 n.2 (1961) (Black, J., concurring) (quoting 98 CONG. REC. 9323 (1952)). At oral
argument in Quanta, Justice Ginsburg asked the Deputy Solicitor General whether there was “a reason
why Congress codified th[e] [first-sale doctrine] in the Copyright Act, but not in the Patent Act?”
Transcript of Oral Argument at 17–18, Quanta Comput., Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008)
(No. 06-937). The government responded—and the Court did not question its response—that
“[Congress] did not attempt in any way to override or change the effect of the first sale doctrine.” Id.
at 18. The same is true of the 2011 America Invents Act. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of 2011,
Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284.
212. Quanta, 553 U.S. 617. The Supreme Court came close, but did not address the issue, in
Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761 (2013).
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Court had not directly addressed the first-sale doctrine in over half a century.213 By
holding that exhaustion occurs at the time of the first authorized, initial sale214—
notwithstanding any use restrictions—the Court reaffirmed the single-royalty
theory.215
Respondent LG Electronics (LGE) owned a portfolio of computer
technology patents.216 Three of these patents involved methods of operating a
computer system.217 LGE licensed this portfolio to Intel Corporation (Intel).218
Under the license, Intel received broad rights to “make, use, [and] sell” the LGE
patents.219 Intel, in turn, sold microprocessors and chipsets that practiced LGE’s
patents to defendant Quanta.220
However, Intel’s license also specified that no license was granted “to any
third party” to combine licensed products with non-LGE or non-Intel components
(rather, the purchaser would need to obtain a separate license for those other
components).221 Further, in a separate “Master Agreement,” Intel agreed to notify
all third-party purchasers of this prohibition; and indeed, Intel properly notified
Quanta.222 But Quanta disregarded this notice by combining the licensed products
with nonlicensed components, and LGE sued Quanta for patent infringement.223
213. The Court had last discussed the exhaustion doctrine directly in 1942. E.g., United States
v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265 (1942); United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241 (1942).
214. Quanta, 553 U.S. at 621.
215. Quanta also addressed two other aspects of the first-sale doctrine that, although matters of
vast importance, go beyond the scope of this Note. First, the Court for the first time held that patented
methods could be exhausted; previously, the Court had only applied the doctrine to patented products.
Id. at 629–30. Second, the Court held that the first sale of an essential component of a patented item
exhausted the patent owner’s rights to the entire item. Id. at 634–35. (citing Univis, 316 U.S. at 250–51).
Interestingly, the Court’s ruling on method patents was the only novel holding in Quanta. The holdings
regarding components and use restrictions had already been firmly established in Univis, 316 U.S. 241,
and Motion Picture Patents, 243 U.S. 502, respectively.
216. Id. at 621.
217. U.S. Patent No. 4,939,641 disclosed a system for ensuring that random access memory
(RAM) and cache memory are updated together, eliminating the problem of “stale” data. Id. at 622. U.S.
Patent No. 5,379,379 disclosed a novel method of processing “write” and “read” requests to and from
RAM that allows for fast, yet still accurate, processing. Id. U.S. Patent No. 5,077,733 disclosed a method
allowing for more efficient data traffic to occur via the bus connecting the computer’s microprocessor
to a chipset. Id. at 622–23.
218. Id. at 623.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 623–24.
221. Id. at 623.
222. Id. at 624.
223. Id. Proponents of the conditional-sale theory have argued that Quanta has no effect on the
first-sale doctrine simply because the license agreement there was poorly written. Austin, supra note 7,
at 2970–71. Specifically, the license agreement noted that “nothing herein shall in any way limit or alter
the effect of patent exhaustion.” Quanta, 553 U.S. at 623. And the Master Agreement stated that “a
breach of this Agreement shall have no effect on . . . the Patent license.” Id. at 624. Some scholars
suggest that, because Quanta did not involve an enforceable use restriction, the conditional-sale theory
is still viable. See Gomulkiewicz, supra note 21, at 237; Austin, supra note 7, at 2970. However, this
argument fails, as simply distinguishing Quanta cannot save the conditional-sale theory. As this Note
has demonstrated, that doctrine met its demise ninety years earlier in Motion Picture Patents, 243 U.S. 502.
See supra Section II.A.
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The Court ruled for Quanta.224 The Court noted that Henry v. A.B. Dick had
permitted use restrictions, but stated that “that decision was short lived.”225 Citing
Motion Picture Patents, the Court reiterated that the Patent Act was designed “to
promote the progress of science and useful arts,” and “not the creation of private
fortunes.”226
Turning to the facts, the Court noted that Intel had properly notified Quanta
of the use restriction, and had received broad rights to make, use, and sell the
patent—that is, an authorized sale had occurred.227 The Court concluded that this
“authorized sale . . . exhausts the patent holder’s rights and prevents the patent
holder from invoking patent law to control post-sale use of the article.”228
In sum, the Supreme Court has made clear that the single-royalty theory is the
law. In fact, district courts have concluded that the conditional-sale theory has been
abolished.229 The strong language in Motion, Graphophone, and Quanta supports this
conclusion.230 But as discussed below, these cases all involve patent owners
implementing use restrictions to help themselves in the market (i.e., to enhance their
private fortunes). Section III discusses that, in limited circumstances, use
restrictions are necessary to promote innovation and the public interest, and
therefore, fall within the intentions of Congress. This conclusion is consistent with
the Court’s first-sale jurisprudence.
III. THE SINGLE-ROYALTY THEORY CANNOT STIFLE INNOVATION
As detailed above, the Supreme Court’s application of the first-sale doctrine
strongly supports the application of the single-royalty theory. But the Court did not
create a bright-line rule with no exceptions. Rather, the single-royalty theory yields
under the appropriate circumstances because, as first explained by Motion Picture
Patents, Congress’s intentions are dispositive.
Section III.A below explains that the single-royalty theory is not a bright-line,
“no exceptions” rule. Rather, the Court’s jurisprudence mandates an ad hoc analysis,
ensuring that the patent owner’s reward sufficiently fosters innovation. This Section
details this Note’s conclusion: that if a use restriction is necessary for innovation (not
simply tied to the market economy), then the use restriction must be enforced.
Section III.B demonstrates that the Court has already found instances where
exceptions are warranted, namely, in cases involving restrictions on licensees.
224. Quanta, 553 U.S. at 638.
225. Id. at 625–26.
226. Id. at 626 (quoting Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502,
511 (1917)).
227. Id. at 636 (rebutting LGE’s argument that the sale was not authorized and that Quanta
therefore could not purchase what Intel was not authorized to sell).
228. Id. at 638.
229. See, e.g., Static Control Components, Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 2d 575, 585–
86 (E.D. Ky. 2009) (“After reviewing Quanta, Mallinckrodt, and the parties arguments, this Court is
persuaded that Quanta overruled Mallinckrodt sub silentio.”).
230. See supra note 156.
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Section III.C critiques the Federal Circuit’s Mallinckrodt decision, but concludes that
the court’s holding—although not its reasoning—survives this ad hoc analysis.
A. The Single-Royalty Theory Must Yield Under Proper Circumstances
As we have seen, the Supreme Court has made clear that a patent owner
generally receives her entire reward through the purchase price of the sold article.
To allow the patent owner to place restrictions on the article’s use would enhance
her reward beyond the intentions of Congress. This the Court cannot allow.
But, on the other hand, the Court has also made clear that the patent owner
must receive a full reward.231 This reward must be sufficient to encourage future
patent owners to put time and effort into developing future inventions.232 It must
encourage innovation.
A court, therefore, must always consider whether condemning a use restriction
would stifle innovation. In most cases, it does not, so the single-royalty theory
applies. But it does do so in limited circumstances, as detailed below. In such
circumstances, the Court must uphold such restrictions.
1.

Determining the Proper Reward Requires an Ad Hoc Analysis

Scholars agree that the U.S. patent system is designed to promote innovation
through granting exclusive rights as a reward.233 The traditional view is that this
reward should “give as little protection as possible consistent with encouraging
innovation.”234 But how much reward should be given before this minimum
incentive is reached?
There is no bright line answer to this question. As Professors Dan Burk and
Mark Lemley note: “Different industries vary greatly in how they approach
innovation, the cost of innovation, and the importance of innovation to continued
growth. For innovation, one size definitely does not fit all.”235 Courts must thus
determine the size of the reward case-by-case, looking at factors such as the type of
creation and the nature of the industry.236
Further, scholars note that any reward involves an equivalent burden on
society. The patent owner’s exclusive rights inhibit competition, so a large reward
yields a large public burden, albeit temporarily.237 As a result, courts also need to
231. United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 278 (1941) (stating the test as whether the
patent owner has received her reward).
232. Id. at 278 (noting that the patent owner’s reward is the means by which innovation is
fostered).
233. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 37, at 37 (“There is virtually unanimous agreement that the
purpose of the patent system is to promote innovation by granting exclusive rights to encourage
invention.”).
234. Lemley, supra note 60, at 1031. No more protection is appropriate, considering that the
patent owner’s exclusive rights come at the expense of the public. See id.
235. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 37, at 38.
236. See Lemley, supra note 60, at 1066.
237. See id. at 1031.
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determine, case-by-case, where the proper balance lies between the inventor’s
benefit and societal harm.238
Therefore, determining the reward needed to foster innovation requires an ad
hoc analysis. The Court will look at the nature of the invention, the nature of the
industry, and the harm to the public. In doing so, the Court will strive to grant the
minimal level of reward that will successfully foster innovation.
2.

The Purchase Price Encourages Innovation in Most Cases

The prospect of selling an invention for monetary compensation will foster
innovation in nearly all circumstances. In fact, the Court in Adams v. Burke found
this to be true “in the essential nature of things”—that is, in ordinary
circumstances.239 This language establishes a strong presumption against enforcing
use restrictions, because the purchase price is a sufficient reward.
“[T]he essential nature of things” occurs where the purchase price can
represent the article’s value. The nature of the article does not require the patent
owner to implement restrictions in order to sell the article. Rather, whether or not
the invention sells depends on the market.240 In this light, the single-royalty theory
does not stifle innovation. Patent owners will strive to create patentable, marketable
inventions. They know that if they create a useful, popular invention, then they will
reap a great reward.
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence has revolved around this “essential nature
of things” category. In this respect, the Court has seen patent owners try to
implement use restrictions to better position themselves in the market. These patent
owners seek to gain a competitive edge that they would not have had without those
restrictions. Such restrictions are unenforceable.
But not all scenarios fall within the “essential nature of things.” Sometimes,
the nature of the invention may warrant use restrictions. At bottom, in all cases, the
test is not simply whether the patent owner has received the purchase price. Rather,
“[t]he test [is] whether or not there has been such a disposition of the article that it
may fairly be said that the patentee has received his reward for the use of the
article.”241 As seen above, receiving the purchase price generally satisfies this test.
However, exceptions exist.
3.

The Nature of the Invention May Warrant Use Restrictions

Use restrictions should be enforced where the nature of the invention justifies
the restriction. As discussed above, the exclusive right granted by Congress must
provide the minimal level of protection required to foster innovation. The Court

238. See id. at 1032.
239. Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453, 456 (1873).
240. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 513 (1917) (“If [the
patent owner’s] discovery is an important one his reward . . . will be large . . . .”).
241. United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 278 (1942).
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will seek—ad hoc—to strike an appropriate balance by considering not only the
benefit to the inventor, but also the resulting harm to society.
In striking this balance, the Court will consider the totality of the
circumstances, including the nature of the invention and the nature of the
industry.242 In most cases, the purchase price is a sufficient reward. Therefore, in
general, the Court should assume that any use restrictions are an attempt to enhance
the patent owner’s position in the market. The burden should then fall on the patent
owner to explain why this is not the case.
To prevail, the patent owner must successfully explain that her use restrictions
are warranted due to the nature of the invention rather than the market. To do so,
the patent owner will need to demonstrate that simply raising the purchase price
will not remove the need for the use restrictions. In other words, the patent owner
must show that the use restrictions are inextricably intertwined with the nature of
the invention or industry. In other words, the purchase price is not able to equal the
reward. The nature must be such that removing the use restrictions would stifle
innovation.
In such scenarios, the use restrictions must be upheld. The case-by-case nature
of this question makes it difficult to predict exactly what scenarios warrant this
result. However, existing case law has depicted two such scenarios: (1) where the
use restrictions are necessary to prevent the invention from harming the public, and
(2) where the use restrictions are necessary to prevent the patent from losing all
value entirely.243
a.

Use Restrictions that Protect the Public

Protecting the public surely warrants the enforcement of use restrictions. To
take an extreme example, suppose an invention has two potential uses: Use A and
Use B. Use A is the invention’s intended use—a valuable, marketable use that can
be enjoyed by the public. Use B, on the other hand, causes widespread
environmental or biological damage that greatly harms the public. The patent owner
requires purchasers to sign a contract that they will use the invention only for Use
A—and not for Use B—and requires them to provide an identical contract to any
subsequent purchaser. A purchaser violates the contract, and the owner sues for
patent infringement.
The case is appealed to the Supreme Court. The defendant argues that per the
Court’s holding in Motion Picture Patents and Quanta, the plaintiff cannot seek to
enhance her reward, as the Patent Act is not intended to secure private fortunes.
The plaintiff counters that she is not extending her reward, but is simply protecting
the public through the use restriction. She argues that the nature of her invention

242. See supra Section III.A.1.
243. Further, as discussed in Section III.B., infra, the Court has established an exception for use
restrictions on licensees, rather than purchasers.
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could potentially harm the public. She needs to protect the public; she cannot
warrant removing the use restriction simply by raising the purchase price.
After hearing both sides, the Court considers how it will ensure that the patent
owner receives a reward just large enough to foster innovation, but no larger. It
considers what is the appropriate balance between the exclusive right granted and
the resulting harm to the public. The Court realizes that, unlike most cases, the use
restriction here actually benefits the public. Further, the Court concludes that, if the
patent owner cannot prohibit Use B, then future patent owners in the industry may
not be incentivized to create similar inventions.
The Court in this case should rule for the plaintiff. The use restriction is
enforceable because it is a result of the nature of the invention, rather than the
market. The restriction is necessary to protect the public and foster innovation.
b.

Use Restrictions that Prevent Destruction of the Patent

The right to exclude is a core tenet of patent law.244 Intellectual property—an
intangible good—is “non-rivalrous”: consumption by one individual does not
prevent simultaneous consumption by another individual.245 Without patent law,
anyone could freely use such nonrivalrous property.246 The right to exclude thus
provides inventors with an incentive to invent.247 The public will not be able to use
inventions for free, but will need to pay for that right.248
In general, the first-sale doctrine does not hinder this incentive. A patent
owner cannot control the disposition of a sold article, but she certainly can control
the disposition of articles that have not been sold. She plans to sell many articles.
With this in mind, future patent owners have a strong incentive to invent.
But suppose the patent owner, absent a use restriction, would be unable to sell
multiple articles. Suppose that the nature of her invention is such that, after a single
sale, consumers will never need to purchase additional articles. In such a case, the
first-sale doctrine would completely swallow the right to exclude. The patent would
be worthless, and innovation would be stifled.
At oral argument in Quanta, Justice Kennedy nicely summed up this scenario
with the following question to LGE’s attorney: “Are there cases where some
downstream restrictions on use might be necessary to prevent the patent from
becoming worthless, i.e., in the biological area for replication of seeds in agriculture
244.
245.

See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 37, at 37.
Harry First, Controlling the Intellectual Property Grab: Protect Innovation, Not Innovators, 38
RUTGERS L.J. 365, 369 (2007) (“[T]he inventions and expressions that intellectual property law protects
are non-rivalrous in consumption . . . .”); see also BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 37, at 7 (“[I]nvention is a
‘public good’ because it is expensive to invent but cheap to copy those inventions.”).
246. Anyone could use intellectual property because it is intangible. For example, if an inventor
discovers a novel method of making a chair, once the public learns of the method, then anyone could
use it themselves. Patent law makes this property exclusive.
247. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 37, at 37.
248. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012) (noting that the damages for patent infringement may in no
circumstances be “less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer”).
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and so forth?”249 Although LGE’s attorney did not directly answer—and the facts
of Quanta did not implicate—the question, Justice Kennedy’s question directly
details a scenario where use restrictions would indeed be enforceable.
The Court came close to answering this question in Bowman v. Monsanto—the
third scenario depicted in this Note’s introduction. In Bowman, respondent
Monsanto sold genetically modified soybeans to farmers, which yielded herbicideresistant crops.250 These crops themselves yielded more soybeans, but Monsanto
prohibited the planting of any second-generation beans.251 The rational was that if
farmers could grow their own soybeans, then after a single sale, farmers would never
need to purchase beans from Monsanto.252
Petitioner Bowman replanted second-generation seeds, and Monsanto sued
for patent infringement.253 The Court, however, did not answer whether the use
restriction was enforceable. It held that—by utilizing second-generation seeds—
Bowman had improperly made, rather than used, the patented invention.254 The
exclusive right to “make” can never be exhausted.255 As a result, the Court did not
need to address Justice Kennedy’s question in Quanta.
After Bowman, one potential response to Justice Kennedy’s question could be
a flat “no.” That argument would note that Bowman determined that seed replication
is impermissible reconstruction, not use. The argument would conclude that Justice
Kennedy’s question is moot because it simply describes a scenario that, in reality,
can never occur.
But this argument fails because it only considers present-day technology. It
would not be difficult to imagine that, in the future, a similar scenario could arise
where it is clear that the purchaser has used, rather than made, the invention.
Perhaps, for example, the DNA of the initial seed could be extracted and then
injected into other seeds, which would themselves gain the desired herbicideresistant qualities. And the Court has made clear that “[a] rule that unanticipated
inventions are without protection would conflict with the core concept of the patent
law that anticipation undermines patentability.”256
Just because such a case has not arisen yet does not detract from the fact that,
when such a case arises in the future, patent owners will need use restrictions to
prevent their patents from becoming worthless. Without such restrictions,
innovation would be stifled. As Justice Roberts stated at oral argument in Bowman:
249. Transcript of Oral Argument at 15–16, Quanta Comput., Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S.
617 (2008) (No. 06-937).
250. Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761, 1764 (2013).
251. Id. Monsanto notified purchasers of this restriction via a “bag tag” notice that was
provided with the soybeans. See Rogers, supra note 10, at 421.
252. Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 686 F. Supp. 2d 834, 837 (S.D. Ind. 2009) (explaining
Monsanto’s argument), aff’d, 657 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2011), aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 1761 (2013).
253. Bowman, 133 S. Ct. at 1765.
254. Id. at 1766.
255. Id.
256. J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 135 (2001).
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“Why in the world would anybody spend any money to try to improve the seed if
as soon as they sold the first one anybody could grow more and have as many of
those seeds as they want?”257
c.

The Court Will Scrutinize the Patent Owner’s Intentions

As the above scenarios demonstrate, use restrictions are enforceable in limited
circumstances. However, even if a patent owner demonstrates that her invention
warrants such restrictions, she must also convince the Court that the restrictions are
not simply a pretext designed to increase market power. What should the Court do,
for example, if a use restriction protects the public health, but also leads to monetary
gain?
As before, the Court will need to engage in an ad hoc analysis to determine the
patent owner’s intentions. The Court has made clear it will look to the “substances
and realities of the transaction” to determine whether a restriction was intended to
“secur[e] . . . that exclusive right . . . which is granted through the patent law, or
whether, under color of such a purpose, it is . . . an effort to profitably extend the
scope of its patent.”258 If the restriction appears truly necessary to secure
innovation, the Court will allow it; if not, then the restriction is unenforceable.259
B. An Exception—Restrictions on Licensees
1.

The “Reward” Drives Both Lines of Cases

The Supreme Court has made a distinction between licensees and
purchasers.260 The Court typically permits a patent owner to restrict a licensee, but
not a purchaser.261 Some scholars believe that this distinction exists because
different lines of case law govern each restriction. While the single-royalty theory
governs restrictions on purchasers,262 a different law controls restrictions on
licensees. The scholars note that only an authorized sale can implicate the first-sale
doctrine.263 So, therefore, if a licensee did not adhere to a restriction, then no first
sale had occurred.
One problem with the above reasoning is that it makes the first-sale doctrine
too easy to circumvent. Some fear that patent owners will simply begin calling their
purchasers “licensees.”264 However, the Court has addressed this concern, saying
257. Transcript of Oral Argument at 3, Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761 (2013) (No.
11-796).
258. Straus v. Victor Talking Mach. Co., 243 U.S. 490, 497–98 (1916).
259. Id. Also, in some cases, the Court may enforce restrictions only to the extent necessary. See
infra note 322.
260. United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 489–90 (1926).
261. Id.
262. See supra Section II.
263. Server & Casey, supra note 15, at 582 (noting that restrictions on licensees do not trigger
exhaustion because the resulting sales are unauthorized).
264. Id. (noting that the Federal Circuit in Mallinckrodt relied on this argument in its holding).
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that it knows to look carefully at any agreement to determine whether it is a purchase
or really a license.265 Therefore, instead, some commentators more correctly fear
that patent owners will use licensees as unnecessary “middlemen,” with the
intention to restrict purchasers.266 It seems odd that the Court would have two lines
of cases that are readily confused.
The answer must be that there are not really two lines of cases. True, the first
sale must be authorized. But, as discussed below, some restrictions on licensees are
unenforceable, even if the licensee adheres to them. This is because a single
concept—the patent owner’s reward—governs restrictions on both licensees and
purchasers. The Court multiple times has expressly said that it only tolerates
restrictions on licensees where the restriction is within the patent owner’s reward.267
The Court has explained that, in the usual case, a licensee with unrestricted access
might hinder the patent owner from making her own sales.268 And the first-sale
doctrine has always protected the patent owner with respect to articles not yet sold.
Therefore, in general, restrictions on licensees are necessary for the patent owner to
receive her reward.
The Court’s reliance on the patent owner’s reward is important. It explains
why licensees are treated differently than purchasers. It reveals that, in both
instances, the “reward” drives the Court’s analysis. With this understanding, patent
owners will be unlikely to improperly circumvent the first-sale doctrine. A patent
owner will not be able to use a licensee as a “middleman” to bind purchasers
because the Court, as always, will analyze whether the restriction is within the patent
owner’s reward.
2.

Restrictions on Licensees Must Be Justified

The case law involving restrictions on licensees makes clear that the
restrictions must be within the scope of the patent owner’s reward. Not all types of
restrictions get through. The Court typically will only enforce restrictions on licenses
where the licensee manufactures the articles, or whether the type of license is
common in the industry.
In United States v. General Electric Co., the Court set forth the law governing
restrictions on licensees.269 General Electric Company (GE) owned three patents
involving the making of electric lamps.270 The U.S. Government sued under
antitrust law, claiming in part that GE was unlawfully restraining trade through GE’s
license agreements. GE would enter into agreements with licensees, and the license
terms provided that GE would be allowed to control the price at which the patented
articles were sold.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.

See infra notes 288–90 and accompanying text.
See Austin, supra note 7, at 2972–73.
See infra Section III.B.2.
United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 490 (1926).
Id.
Id. at 480–81.

Roth__production read v5 (clean) (Do Not Delete)

1266

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

3/13/2016 7:17 PM

[Vol. 5:1231

The Court acknowledged that, against purchasers, use restrictions are typically
unenforceable: “It is well settled . . . that where a patentee makes the patented article
and sells it, he can exercise no future control over what the purchaser may wish to
do with the article after his purchase.”271 But the Court stated that “the question is
a different one” when considering “what a patentee who grants a license . . . to make
and vend . . . may do in limiting the licensee.”272
The Court then ruled that use restrictions on licensees are enforceable
“provided the conditions of sale are normally and reasonably adapted to secure
pecuniary reward for the patentee’s monopoly.”273 The Court explained that the
price at which a licensee sells a patent article affects the patent owner’s ability to sell
other patented articles.274 GE had thus acted “entirely reasonabl[y]” to control the
licensee’s sale price.275
A similar result occurred in General Talking Pictures v. Western Electric Co.276 The
American Telephone & Telegraph Company owned patents on vacuum tube
amplifiers.277 The technology was useful in both commercial theaters as well as in
private radio.278 The American Transformer Company had a nonexclusive license
to sell the amplifiers for private use only.279 But it sold the amplifiers to a
purchaser—the petitioner—with both parties knowing the purchaser would use it
in the commercial field.280
The Court found the purchaser liable, as the restriction on the licensee was
enforceable, and the purchaser had notice.281 The Court concluded that the
restriction on the licensee was within the patent owner’s reward.282 The Court
subsequently affirmed that reasoning by stating:
The patentee may grant a license upon any condition the performance of
which is reasonably within the [patent owner’s] reward . . . . The restriction
here imposed is of that character. . . . [I]t is common practice where a
patented invention is applicable to different uses . . . [to] restrict[ ] to one
or more of the several fields of use . . . .283
The Court upheld the restriction as a result.284

271. Id. at 489. Later in the opinion, the Court strongly endorsed the general application of the
single-royalty theory by noting that “a patentee may not attach . . . a condition running with the article
in the hands of purchasers.” Id. at 494.
272. Id. at 489.
273. Id. at 490.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Gen. Talking Pictures Corp. v. W. Elec. Co., 304 U.S. 175, 181 (1938).
277. Id. at 176, 179.
278. Id. at 179.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 180.
281. Id. at 180, 183.
282. Id. at 181.
283. Gen. Talking Pictures Corp. v. W. Elec. Co., 305 U.S. 124, 127 (1938).
284. Id.
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In some instances, however, the Court has found that restrictions on licensees
are unenforceable. For example, in Straus v. Victor Talking Machine Co., the Court
found that an alleged license was actually a sale to a purchaser.285 Among other
things, the patent owner required immediate payment of full consideration and did
not keep itself closely informed of the product’s disposition.286 The Court found
that the patent owner was simply trying to mask an impermissible use restriction
under the licensee exception.287
Also, the Court has refused to enforce restrictions on licensees that are too
broad. In Standard Sanitary v. United States, the Court found that the purpose of the
licensee restriction—control of the enamel iron industry—”clearly . . . transcended
what was necessary to protect the use of the patent.”288 Similarly, in United States v.
Masonite Corp., the Court found that the restrictions on licensees impermissibly
attempted to restrain competition in the hardboard industry.289 The Masonite Court
explained that “[i]n the General Electric case, the Court thought that the purpose . . .
was to secure to the patentee . . . a reward for his invention. We cannot agree that
that is true here.”290
It therefore appears clear that the cases involving restrictions on licensees stem
from the same reasoning as restrictions on purchasers. In both cases, the Court will
ensure that the patent owner is not inflating her reward. But restrictions are always
permitted when necessary to secure that reward.
C. The Federal Circuit’s Jurisprudence
Despite the Supreme Court’s strong presumption in favor of the single-royalty
theory, the Federal Circuit has developed its own jurisprudence that favors the
conditional-sale theory. Beginning with the court’s decision in Mallinckrodt v.
Medipart,291 the Federal Circuit has made clear that use restrictions are generally
enforceable. The Federal Circuit’s 2010 decision in Princo v. International Trade
Commission makes clear that the court has adhered to its own jurisprudence even
after the Supreme Court’s 2008 Quanta decision.292
The Federal Circuit’s failure to align itself with Supreme Court decisions is
troubling. The Federal Circuit was created in part to provide predictable, uniform

285. See Straus v. Victor Talking Mach. Co., 243 U.S. 490, 498, 500 (1916) (finding that the
alleged license was “a disguised attempt to control the prices of its machines after they have been sold
and paid for”).
286. Id. at 498–99. By contrast, in General Electric, the licensee paid no money until the item was
sold. General Electric, 272 U.S. at 484.
287. See Straus, 243 U.S. at 500.
288. Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20, 48 (1912).
289. United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 280–81 (1942).
290. Id. at 280.
291. Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
292. Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (continuing to
apply Mallinckrodt in spite of Quanta). As noted above, as this Note goes to press, the en banc Federal
Circuit is considering overruling Mallinckrodt in light of Quanta. Supra note 17.
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results in the area of patent law.293 Some scholars argue that the Federal Circuit’s
jurisprudence has done anything but that; rather, the Circuit has caused confusion
and uncertainty.294 In recent years, the Supreme Court has begun hearing more
patent cases than ever before, almost always reversing the Federal Circuit.295
The Mallinckrodt decision is a good example of the confusion the Federal
Circuit has caused. Below, this Note first discusses why the court’s reasoning is
inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, even prior to Quanta. Then,
this Note explains that, although Mallinckrodt’s reasoning is misguided, the facts of
Mallinckrodt support the ultimate holding under Supreme Court jurisprudence. This
is why Quanta did not overrule Mallinckrodt and made no mention of Mitchell v.
Hawley.
1.

Mallinckrodt’s Reasoning Is Not Supported by Law

Mallinckrodt involved a patented medical device that used radioactive mist to
diagnose whether a patient had lung disease.296 A nebulizer would generate the
radioactive material, the patient would inhale the material via a mouthpiece, and
whatever the patient exhaled would be trapped and analyzed by the device.297
Plaintiff Mallinckrodt made and sold these devices to hospitals with a “single use”
notification affixed to the packaging.298 The hospitals were instructed to dispose of
the device in a radiation-shielded container after the first use.299
But the hospitals ignored Mallinckrodt’s notice; they instead shipped the
devices to defendant Medipart to be refurbished.300 Medipart would attempt to
sterilize the devices and would then send them back to the hospitals.301 Mallinckrodt
sued Medipart for patent infringement.302 Medipart argued that, under the Supreme
Court’s decisions in Bauer and Motion Picture Patents, the conditional-sale theory had
met its demise.303 Mallinckrodt countered that conditional sales are permissible and

293. Wegner, supra note 17, at 686 (“When the Federal Circuit was established in 1982, it was
done so seemingly with a mandate for the new court to create a uniform body of patent law for the
United States.”).
294. Gomulkiewicz, supra note 21, at 201 (highlighting the discontent that some scholars have
with the Federal Circuit).
295. Gretchen S. Sween, Who’s Your Daddy? A Psychoanalytic Exegesis of the Supreme Court’s Recent
Patent Jurisprudence, 7 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 204, 204 (2008–2009) (calling the last decade a
“flurry of reversals”).
296. Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 701.
297. Id. at 702.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id. Specifically, Medipart exposed the devices to “at least 2.5 megarads of gamma
radiation”; however, Medipart did not test the devices afterward for biological activity or radioactivity.
Id.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 703.
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that further, the nature of the invention implicated the health and safety of the
public.304
The Federal Circuit ruled for Mallinckrodt under the conditional-sale
theory.305 The court held that Bauer and Motion were simply instances of patent
misuse, and that “not all restrictions on the use of patented goods are
unenforceable.”306 Citing General Electric, the court noted that restrictions on
licensees are permitted where the restriction reasonably secures the patent owner’s
reward.307 The court acknowledged that General Electric involved a restriction on a
licensee—and not a purchaser—but said that “neither law, public policy, nor logic”
warranted making this distinction.308 The court noted that a licensee versus
purchaser distinction would be easy to circumvent with better contract drafting and
that the law cannot turn on “formalistic line drawing.”309
The Court held: “Unless the [use] condition violates some other law or
policy . . . private parties retain the freedom to contract concerning conditions of
sale.”310 In the patent context, so long as the restriction is “reasonably within the
patent grant,” it properly secures the patent owner’s reward under General Electric.311
With this holding, the Federal Circuit revived the conditional-sale theory from the
grave.
The flaw in the Federal Circuit’s reasoning is twofold. First, the Federal Circuit
distinguishes Bauer and Motion Picture Patents on the ground that those cases involved
patent misuse.312 But as detailed in Section II.A, those cases clearly turn on the
Court’s determination that post-sale control by the patent owner goes beyond
Congress’s intentions.313 Mallinckrodt looks at the Court’s holding but ignores the
Court’s reasoning.
Second, the Federal Circuit is incorrect that there is no basis in law for making
a distinction between restrictions on licensees and restrictions on purchasers. As
noted in Section III.B, General Electric clearly held that “the question is a different
one” when dealing with restrictions on licensees.314 Further, the Court’s ad hoc
analysis prevents the cases from turning on “formalistic line drawing.”315 The Court
will look to the “substances and realities” of the transaction to discern whether the
304. Id.
305. Id. at 709.
306. Id. at 703.
307. Id. at 704–05 (quoting United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 489 (1926)).
308. Id. at 705.
309. Id.
310. Id. at 708.
311. See id. The Federal Circuit in B. Braun Medical, Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories, 124 F.3d 1419, 1426
(Fed. Cir. 1997), elaborates that whether a restriction is within the patent grant turns on “whether, by
imposing the condition, the patentee has ‘impermissibly broadened the “physical or temporal scope”
of the patent grant with anticompetitive effect.’”
312. Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 704.
313. See supra Section II.A.
314. United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 489 (1926); see also supra Section III.B.
315. Such line drawing was the court’s fear in Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 708.
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patent owner has attempted to disguise a purchaser restriction as a licensee
restriction.316 Overall, the Federal Circuit’s reasoning is inconsistent with the
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence.
2.

Mallinckrodt’s Holding Was Correct—It Protected Public Safety

As discussed above, Mallinckrodt’s reasoning is inconsistent with the first-sale
doctrine and the Supreme Court’s holding in Quanta. Further, the Supreme Court
in Quanta reversed the Federal Circuit, which had relied on Mallinckrodt’s
reasoning.317 The big question, then, is why did Quanta not overrule Mallinckrodt?
The answer is likely that Quanta did not want to completely shut the door on
the conditional-sale theory. As noted in Section III.A.3 above, certain scenarios
require the application of the conditional-sale theory.318 One such scenario is when
the use restriction is necessary to protect the health of the public.
Had Quanta flatly overruled Mallinckrodt, Quanta would have overturned a
holding that was very likely correct. Mallinckrodt involved a medical device that
generated a radioactive mist inhaled by patients for the diagnosis of lung disease.319
The patients would then exhale directly into the device.320 Although Medipart
attempted to sterilize the devices, it did not test for residual biological activity or
radioactivity.321 Mallinckrodt expressly argued that the “single use” restriction was
required to protect the public health.
Should Mallinckrodt have been required to simply hope that patients would
not get sick after reusing the refurbished medical devices? From this perspective,
the single use restriction appears necessary to secure innovation. Mallinckrodt will
not likely be incentivized to make nebulizers if patients will get sick and sue
Mallinckrodt. This use restriction does not harm the public; it benefits the public.
Of course, the Court will need to look at all the circumstances to ensure that
Mallinckrodt does not have improper intentions.322 But the facts in this case (i.e.,
316. Straus v. Victor Talking Mach. Co., 243 U.S. 490, 497–98 (1916).
317. LG Elecs., Inc. v. Bizcom Elecs., Inc., 453 F.3d 1364, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2006), rev’d sub nom.
Quanta Comput., Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008).
318. See supra Section III.A.3.
319. Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 702.
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. See Straus v. Victor Talking Mach. Co., 243 U.S. 490, 497–98 (1916). Further, the Court
may enforce the use restrictions to the extent that they protect the public health. In Ethyl Gasoline Corp.
v. United States, 309 U.S. 436, 445–46 (1939), the government sought to enjoin Ethyl Gasoline from
enforcing license provisions involving the sale of patented gasoline additives to oil refiners. The license
contained multiple clauses, one of which required the oil refiners—as well as any subsequent
purchasers—to conform to the health regulations set by the Surgeon General. Id. at 447. The Court
engaged in an ad hoc analysis, holding that the license as a whole sought to “control conduct by the
licensee not embraced in the patent monopoly.” Id. at 456. However, the Court expressly stated that
the health provisions “are not interfered with by the decree.” Id. at 459–60. The Court thus
demonstrated its willingness to enforce certain restrictions, but not others, based on whether the
restriction was meant to protect the public health.
Notably, at oral argument in Lexmark, Judge Newman appeared to support this Note’s contention
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the nature of the patented invention) appear to warrant the use restriction. Quanta
did not want to upset precedent that protects the public health.
CONCLUSION
The first-sale doctrine strives to strike the appropriate balance between the
rights of patent owners and the rights of personal property owners. The first
authorized sale exhausts the patent owner’s ability to control the further disposition
of the sold article. As a result, personal property owners have complete control over
purchased articles. Allowing such control promotes competition and ensures that
the sold articles may be used in the most efficient way possible. At the same time,
the patent owner retains the right to exclude others from using patented articles not
yet sold.
The Court has not provided a bright-line rule as to whether express use
restrictions on patented articles are enforceable. In most cases, however, the singleroyalty theory appears to control, prohibiting patent owners from implementing
such restrictions on purchasers. The rationale is that use restrictions hinder the
purchaser’s rights and improperly inflate the patent owner’s reward. However, in
certain scenarios where the nature of the invention warrants the use restrictions, it
appears likely that such restrictions are enforceable. For example, if the use
restrictions are necessary to protect the public heath, or to prevent the destruction
of the patent, then the Court will uphold those restrictions. In such cases, the
restrictions do not improperly inflate the patent owner’s reward. Rather, the
restrictions are necessary to foster innovation—a central requirement of the patent
statute. Overall, the Court will engage in an ad hoc analysis to ensure that innovation
is fostered without unduly harming the public or inflating the patent owner’s reward.
The first-sale doctrine cannot stifle innovation.

that an ad hoc approach is necessary to protect the public health. Recording of Oral Argument at 19:16–
20:03, Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Impression Prods., Inc., No. 14-1617 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 2, 2015) (“What’s so
troublesome about these cases—you get wrapped up in generalizations . . . . [In] Mallinckrodt, the
restriction on reuse was for a product, a nebulizer, which, in use, gets filled with pneumococcus and
other deadly bacteria and viruses . . . . So, the producer says: ‘You can’t reuse this. You’ll kill everybody.’
And yet, here we are, saying that’s not allowed . . . . Don’t we have to allow our evolution of the law to
recognize the complexities of practice . . . ?”).
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